

9/28/76

TELETYPE

P 281900Z SEP 76

FM BUENOS AIRES (109-1) (109-2)

TO DIRECTOR (109-12-227) (109-12-201) PRIORITY -28

BT

~~SECRET~~

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA; IS-ARGENTINA; FPM-URUGUAY;
IS-URUGUAY.

ON SEPTEMBER 28, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD WHO IS
CONNECTED WITH THE ARGENTINE ARMY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, PROVIDED
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (S) (U)

28-47

DURING THE PERIOD SEPTEMBER 17-20, 1976, MEMBERS OF THE
ARGENTINE STATE SECRETARIAT FOR INFORMATION (SIDE) OPERATING
WITH OFFICERS OF THE URUGUAYAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
CARRIED OUT OPERATIONS AGAINST THE URUGUAYAN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION,
THE OPR-33 IN BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA. AS A RESULT OF THESE JOINT
OPERATIONS, SIDE OFFICIALS CLAIMED THAT THE ENTIRE OPR-33 INFRA-
STRUCTURE IN ARGENTINA HAS BEEN ELIMINATED. A LARGE VOLUME OF U. S.
CURRENCY WAS SEIZED DURING THE COMBINED OPERATIONS DURING THE
AFOREMENTIONED PERIOD. (S) (U)

3 - Bue (109-1) 80-84 [Dr. Poire] (S) (U)
(1 - 109-2)
(1 - 105-548)

RWS:gjk (3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

5-1-01
CLASSIFIED BY: 39063 zfw/blc/smp
REASON: 1.5 (C D)
DECLASSIFY ON: XI 6
Argentina Project
4th Bureau

BAGE TWO BUE 109-1 109-2 ~~SECRET~~

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5/31, MGDS-2 INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE

[SOURCE IS DR. ARTURO HORACIO POIRE.] (~~S~~) (U)

COORDINATED LOCALLY.

BT

THE AMBASSADOR
VIA DCM

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ /28/76

ROBERT W. SCHERRER, LEGAL ATTACHE

COMBINED OPERATIONS AGAINST THE [OPR-33 IN BUENOS AIRES] (S) (U)

On 9/28/76, a source who has provided reliable information in the past advised as follows: (S) (U)

During the period September 24-27, 1976, members of the Argentine State Secretariat for Information (SIDE), operating with officers of the Uruguayan Military Intelligence Service carried out operations against the Uruguayan terrorist organization, the OPR-33 in Buenos Aires, Argentina. As a result of these joint operations, SIDE officials claimed that the entire OPR-33 infrastructure in Argentina has been eliminated. A large volume of U. S. currency was seized during the combined operations during the aforementioned period. (S) (U)

Copies: 1 - Addressee
1 - POL-R
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(109-2)
RWS:gjk
(6)

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5-1-01
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REASON: 1.5 (C, d)
DECLASSIFY ON: X 1,6

~~SECRET~~

Classified By 5931
Exempt from General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category 5B(2)
Automatically declassified on Indefinite

5-1-01
CLASSIFIED BY 39063ELW/ACE/PC
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6
Argentina Project

~~SECRET~~

109-2-1692

~~SECRET~~

THE AMBASSADOR
VIA DEM

9/28/76

ROBERT W. SCHERRER, LEGAL ATTACHE

"OPERATION CONDOR"

On 9/28/76, a source who has furnished reliable information in the past advised as follows:

"Operation Condor" is the code name for the collection, exchange and storage of intelligence data concerning so-called "Leftists", Communists and Marxists, which was recently established between cooperating intelligence services in South America in order to eliminate Marxist terrorist activities in the area. In addition, "Operation Condor" provides for joint operations against terrorist targets in member countries of "Operation Condor." Chile is the center for "Operation Condor" and in addition to Chile, its members include Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay. Brazil also has tentatively agreed to supply intelligence input for "Operation Condor." Members of "Operation Condor" showing the most enthusiasm to date have been Argentina, Uruguay and Chile. The latter three countries have engaged in joint operations, primarily in Argentina, against the terrorist target. During the week of September 20, 1976, the director of the Argentine Army Intelligence Service traveled to Santiago, Chile, to consult with his Chilean counterparts with respect to "Operation Condor."

A third and most secret phase of "Operation Condor" involves the formation of special teams from member countries who are to travel anywhere in the world to non-member countries to carry out sanctions up to assassination against terrorists or supporters of terrorist organizations from "Operation Condor" member countries. For example, should a terrorist or a supporter of a terrorist organization from a member country of "Operation Condor" be located in a European country, a special team from

Copies: 1 - Addressee
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1 - DAO
1 - SY

② - Bae (109-2)
(1 - 109-9)

RWS:gjk

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OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

Classified By 5931

Exempt from General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category 5B(2)

Automatically declassified on Indefinite

~~SECRET~~

109-2-1693

6/15/00
5/3/01

CLASSIFIED BY: 3963/WBCE/sam
REASON: 1.5 (D)
DECLASSIFY ON: X, b

Argentina Project
Pinochet Project SP/Ch/Tam

~~SECRET~~

RE: "OPERATION CONDOR"

"Operation Condor" would be dispatched to locate and surveil the target. When the location and surveillance operation has terminated, a second team from "Operation Condor" would be dispatched to carry out the actual sanction against the target. Special teams would be issued false documentation from member countries of "Operation Condor" and may be composed exclusively of individuals from one member nation of "Operation Condor", or may be composed of a mixed group from various "Operation Condor" member nations. Two European countries, specifically mentioned for possible operations under the third phase of "Operation Condor", were France and Portugal. (S) (U)

A special team has been organized in Argentina [made up of members of the Argentine Army Intelligence Service and the State Secretariat for Information (SIDE)] which are being prepared for possible future action under the third phase of "Operation Condor."

- 2 -

~~SECRET~~

F B I

Date: 10/4/76

~~SECRET~~Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via TELETYPE 278 URGENT
(Priority)

p 04 Z OCT 76

FM BUENOS AIRES (109-2) (109-103) (P)

TO DIRECTOR (109-12-201) PRIORITY 211 -04 5-1-01

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~CLASSIFIED BY: 39063 E/W BCE/sen
REASON: 1.5 (c)
DECLASSIFY ON: X 1
Argentina's ProjectFOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA; IS-ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM-ARGENTINA.ON OCTOBER 2, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD WHO IS AN
OFFICIAL OF THE ARGENTINE ARMY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (AAIS)
PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (S) (U)ARGENTINE PRESIDENT LT. GENERAL JOSE RAFAEL VIDELA ATTENDED
A CEREMONY AT CAMPO DE MAYO, A LARGE ARGENTINE ARMY INSTALLATION
LOCATED IN BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE, THE MORNING OF OCTOBER 2, 1976.
A SMALL REVIEWING STAND HAD BEEN SET UP AT CAMPO DE MAYO TO
ACCOMMODATE PRESIDENT VIDELA AND OTHER ATTENDING ARGENTINE
GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY OFFICIALS. APPROXIMATELY FIVE MINUTES
AFTER PRESIDENT VIDELA AND HIS ENTOURAGE DEPARTED THE REVIEWING
STAND, A MEDIUM SIZE BOMB EXPLODED, CAUSING PART OF THE REVIEWING
STAND TO COLLAPSE AND INJURING A NEWSPAPER REPORTER, AN ARGENTINE (S) (U)④ - Bue ((109-2) (109-103)
(105-767 Montoneros) (80-173 Capt. Lucero) (S) 109-2 1701
RWS:gjk

RWS (4)

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent

10/4/76

M

Per

LTK

U.S. Government Printing Office: 1972 - 455-574

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED
DATE: 7-10-96 BY: SP6A9/Cal/DK 10-29-76ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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F B I

Date: ~~SECRET~~Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)PAGE TWO BUE 109-2 109-103 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ARMY NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICER AND AN ARGENTINE ARMY COMMISSIONED OFFICER. INVESTIGATION ESTABLISHED THAT THE BOMB WAS MADE UP OF LESS THAN FOUR OUNCES OF ~~PROTYL~~ AND IT HAD BEEN DETONATED BY A CLOCK-LIKE TIMING DEVICE. DURING THE LATE AFTERNOON OF OCTOBER 2, 1976, THE AAIS DETAINED AN INDIVIDUAL WHO WAS AN EMPLOYEE OF THE BUENOS AIRES MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT WHO HAD TAKEN PART IN THE INSTALLATION OF THE REVIEWING STAND AT CAMPO DE MAYO AND WHO ADMITTED HIS PARTICIPATION IN THE PLACEMENT OF THE BOMB. THE ATTEMPT AGAINST PRESIDENT VIDELA'S LIFE WAS CARRIED OUT BY THE MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION. ~~(S)~~ (U)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5261 XGDS-2 INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE.

[SOURCE IS MAJOR JUAN LUCERO, AAIS.] ~~(S)~~ (U)

COORDINATED LOCALLY.

BT

~~SECRET~~Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

F B I

Date: 10/4/76

Transmit the following in _____
CODE
(Type in plaintext or code)Via CABLE RRX IMMEDIATE
(Priority)O 04 ¹⁶⁰⁰ Z OCT 76FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES (109-2) (109-103)
TO DIRECTOR (109-12-201) ~~PRIORITY~~ ²¹³⁻⁰⁴
BT~~CONFIDENTIAL~~FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA; IS - ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM - ARGENTINA.

ON OCTOBER 4, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD, WHO IS
AN OFFICIAL WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF FEDERAL SECURITY (INTELLIGENCE
DIVISION), FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA (FPA), PROVIDED THE
FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (S) (U)

AT APPROXIMATELY 10:00 A.M., OCTOBER 4, 1976, A SUSPICIOUS
VEHICLE WAS OBSERVED NEAR A PUBLIC PLAZA IN FRONT OF THE
SHERATON HOTEL IN BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA. THE FPA BOMB SQUAD
WAS CALLED AND ASCERTAINED THAT THE VEHICLE CONTAINED FIVE ARMED
ROCKETS WHICH WERE AIMED AT THE SHERATON HOTEL AND WERE TO BE
FIRED BY A TIMING DEVICE. THE ROCKETS WERE DEACTIVATED BY THE
FPA BOMB SQUAD BEFORE THEY COULD BE FIRED (S) (U)

A PREVIOUS ROCKET ATTACK WAS CARRIED OUT AGAINST THE SHERATON
HOTEL UTILIZING THE SAME TYPE OF ROCKETS ON 10/8/73. ON THIS
OCCASION ROCKETS REACHED THE UPPER FLOORS OF THE HOTEL AND

UPON EXPLODING AGAINST THE BUILDING RELEASED PROPAGANDA TO

Approved: 1 - 80-Marcote (S) (U)
RWS:jm (3)
Special Agent in Charge

Sent

1:00 P M

Per

U.S. Government Printing Office: 1972 - 455-574

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: 39063 E/W/BCE/SAM
REASON: C, D
DECLASSIFY ON: X 1/6
Argentina Project

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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F B I

Date: ~~SECRET~~Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)PAGE TWO ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUE 109-2 109-103COMMEMORATE THE DEATH OF SLAIN ARGENTINE-BORN CUBAN GUERRILLA
LEADER, ERNESTO CHE GUEVARA. ~~(S)~~ (U)~~CLASSIFIED BY 5831 XGDS-2, INDEFINITE.~~ADMINISTRATIVE (2 CR, 3 lf)[SOURCE IS COMISARIO MAYOR CARLOS VICENTE MARCOTE, DEPARTMENT
OF FEDERAL SECURITY, FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA.] ~~(S)~~ (U)

COORDINATED LOCALLY.

BT

~~SECRET~~Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

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FBI

Date: 10/8/76

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(Precedence)

P 08 Z OCT 76

FM BUENOS AIRES (109-2)(109-103)
TO DIRECTOR (109-12-201) PRIORITY

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA; IS - ARGENTINA;
ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM - ARGENTINA.

ON OCTOBER 8, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD, WHO IS AN
OFFICIAL WITH THE FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA (FPA), DEPARTMENT
OF FEDERAL SECURITY (INTELLIGENCE DIVISION), PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING
INFORMATION: (S) (U)

DURING THE EVENING OF OCTOBER 7-8, 1976, IN COMMEMORATION OF
THE CAPTURE AND DEATH OF ARGENTINE-BORN CUBAN GUERRILLA LEADER,
ERNESTO "CHE" GUEVARA, ARGENTINE TERRORISTS CARRIED OUT A SERIES OF
BOMBINGS IN THE FEDERAL CAPITAL OF BUENOS AIRES, PRIMARILY AGAINST
THE SHOWROOMS OF FOREIGN CONTROLLED AUTOMOBILE COMPANIES. ONE OF
THE SHOWROOMS OF THE FORD MOTOR COMPANY WAS BOMBED, AS WELL AS A
BRANCH OF THE BANK OF BOSTON. (S) (U)

THERE WERE NO ~~EXXEXE~~ PHYSICAL INJURIES AS A RESULT OF THE
BOMBINGS AND PROPERTY DAMAGE WAS GENERALLY REPORTED AS MODERATE. (S) (U)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931 XGDS-2 INDEFINITE.~~

1 - 80-MARCOTE (S) (U)
rws:jn (3)
Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

1707

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Date:

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Via _____
(Precedence)

PAGE TWO BUE 109-2 109-103 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
ADMINISTRATIVE

SOURCE IS COMISARIO MAYOR CARLOS VICENTE MARCOTE, DIRECTOR
OF OPERATIONS, FPA, DEPARTMENT OF FEDERAL SECURITY. (S) (U)

COORDINATED LOCALLY.

BT

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

~~SECRET~~

F B I

Date: 10/14/76

Transmit the following in _____
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(Priority)

P 14 Z OCT 76

FM BUENOS AIRES (109-2) (109-103) (P)
TO DIRECTOR (109-12-201) PRIORITY ²¹⁹ 14

BT

~~SECRET~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
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OTHERWISE~~XXXXX~~ FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA; IS-ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM-ARGENTINA.ON OCTOBER 13, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD WHO IS AN
OFFICIAL OF THE STATE SECRETARIAT FOR INFORMATION (SIDE), AN
ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING
INFORMATION: (S) (U)ON OCTOBER 8, 1976, ARGENTINE SECURITY FORCES DISCOVERED WHAT
IS BELIEVED TO BE THE LAST REMAINING CELL OF THE PEOPLE'S
REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP) AUGUST 22 FACTION, AN ARGENTINE TERRORIST
ORGANIZATION. THE CELL WAS COMPOSED OF FIVE MEMBERS, WHO DIED WHEN
THEY RESISTED THE SECURITY FORCES. AMONG MATERIAL FOUND IN
POSSESSION OF THE CELL WAS A ~~BOOK WHICH WAS~~ A THREE-RING BOUND
LOOSE LEAF ^{BOOK} BOOK ISSUED BY THE ARGENTINE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (S) (U)4 - Bue (109-2)
(1 - 109-103)
(109-38 ERP) ~~109-38~~
(1 - 80-84 Dr ^{Dr} ~~Horacio~~ Poire) (S) (U)

RWS:gjk

CLASSIFIED BY: 39063E/WBCE/152M
REASON: 1.5 (C D)
DECLASSIFY ON: X16

Argentina Project

Classified by 9803 RDD/ed
Declassify on: OADR 90-2530

Approved: _____

Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

U.S. Government Printing Office: 1972 - 455-574

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED
BY DEPARTMENTAL REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE: 11-9-94 page 142

F B I

Date: ~~SECRET~~Transmit the following in _____
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(Priority)PAGE TWO BUE 109-2 109-103 ~~SECRET~~

WHICH CONTAINS THE NAME, ADDRESS, TITLE AND DATE OF ACCREDITATION OF ALL FOREIGN DIPLOMATS IN ARGENTINA. THIS MATERIAL DATED BACK TO LATE 1972 OR EARLY 1973. THE SECTION CONTAINING THE ADDRESS OF U. S. EMBASSY PERSONNEL HAD BEEN REMOVED FROM THE NORMAL ORDER OF THE BINDER; HOWEVER, THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT ANY PARTICULAR MEMBER CONTAINED IN THE LIST HAD BEEN SINGLED OUT FOR ANY TERRORIST ACTION. ~~(S)~~ (U)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931 XGDS-2.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE.

[SOURCE IS DR. ARTURO H. POIRE, SIDE.] ~~(S)~~ (U)

THE FOREGOING INFORMATION IS EXCLUSIVE AND WILL BE COORDINATED LOCALLY.

BT

~~SECRET~~

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

~~SECRET~~

THE AMBASSADOR
VIA DCM

10/14/76

LEGAL ATTACHE ROBERT W. SCHERRER

ERP AUGUST 22ND FACTION

On 10/13/76, a confidential source, who is connected with one of the Argentine Government security services, provided the following information:

On 10/8/76 Argentine security forces discovered what is believed to be the last remaining cell of the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) August 22 Faction, an Argentine terrorist organization. The cell was composed of five members who died when they resisted the security forces. Among material found in possession of the cell was a three-ring bound looseleaf binder issued by the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Relations, which contains the name, address, title and date of accreditation of all foreign diplomats in Argentina. This material dated back to late 1972 or early 1973. The section containing the address of U. S. Embassy personnel had been removed from the normal order of the binder; however, there is no indication that any particular member contained in the list had been singled out for any terrorist action.

- 1 - Addressee
 - 1 - POL/R
 - 1 - DAO
 - 1 - SY
 - 4 - Buenos Aires
 - (1 - 109-2)(1 - 109-103)
 - (1 - 109-38)(1 - 80-84)
- RWS:jn (8)

DECLASSIFIED BY 39063 E/W BCF/SM
DATE 5-1-01
Argentina Project

~~SECRET~~

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Exempt from General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category 5B(2)
Automatically declassified on Indefinite

1715

TELEGRAM

CONTROL: 6743

14 Oct '76

1205

INDICATE

☐ COLLECT

☐ CHARGE TO

FROM

Amembassy BUENOS AIRES

CLASSIFICATION

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

E.O. 11652:

N/A

TAGS:

ELAB, AR

SUBJECT:

Strike in Electric Utilities Continues

ACTION:

Secstate WASHDC

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ BUENOS AIRES 6743

REF:

Buenos Aires 6671

AMB
DCM
POL-3
POL/R
ECOM
USIS
DAO
MIGLP
SCIAT
LEGAT
RF
CHRON

1. SUMMARY: The labor conflict in the Buenos Aires electric utility plants is continuing and appears to be spreading to other parts of the country. A contributing factor has been the kidnapping and disappearance of three SEGBA employees, presumably by police agents. Government and management representatives are continuing their refusal to discuss the issues in dispute, although suggesting this might be possible once the legislative proposal abrogating portions of the industry collective agreement (originally signed in 1948 and modified over the years) considered prejudicial have been enacted into law. Luz y Fuerza union leaders reportedly have refused to lead a general strike against the government and assert that they are attempting to maintain their sectoral strike within certain responsible bounds. However, they admit they may be losing their ability to control worker reactions. From their narrow perspective, union sources allege that the Energy Secretariat has found support for its precipitous actions from

DRAFTED BY:

POL:AGFreeman:cc

DRAFTING DATE

10/13/76

TEL. EXT.

121,

CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:

POL:WSSmith

CLEARANCES:

ECOM:RReed

SEARCHED
SERIALIZED

INDEXED
FILED

DCM:MChaplin

OCT 14 1976

AMB:RChill


LEGAL ATTACHE - BUENOS AIRES

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

CLASSIFICATION

OPTIONAL FORM 153
(Formerly FS-413)
January 1975
Dept. of State

ambitious elements within the Navy, supposedly anxious for a banner with which ~~to~~ to effect fundamental changes in government policy, and perhaps changes in the top government leadership as well. Nevertheless, President Videla, possibly for fear of encouraging greater labor indiscipline, appears not to have taken any action which would reverse or soften the high-handed tactics of SEGBA management and the Energy Secretariat. END SUMMARY.



2. Despite official management communiques announcing the end of last week's sit-in strike and the normalization of work activities in Buenos Aires' light and power industry, it is evident that slowdowns, work stoppages, street demonstrations, work accidents produced by acts of negligence or outright sabotage and sporadic power failure are continuing, and may also be spreading to other areas in the country. There has been a fire in one of SEGBA's generators in the Buenos Aires port area, other generators are not functioning, power lines have been flooded, and there have been other incidents, further exacerbated by rain, causing temporary blackouts in various neighborhoods and outlying districts. According to press accounts, the privately-owned Italo-Argentina's light and power services have been affected even more by the labor conflict than/SEGBA and the Agua & Energia enterprise. The latter facility, which supplies electricity to cities in Buenos Aires province and other provinces, has also been affected.

3. According to union sources, over 300 employees have now been dismissed, including about 40 from Agua y Energia. An undetermined number of strikers have been detained by police and released following questioning. More arrests were reported today (Oct 13). Police cleared striking workers out of SEGBA offices today after the day which the enterprise reportedly declared today a company holiday.

4. A complicating factor stirring up workers anew has been the kidnapping of three SEGBA employees last Friday night from their

homes by men in civilian clothes, presumed to be security or parapolice agents. Two of the three were among those dismissed by SEGBA last week. In protest against the kidnapping, over 300 employees walked out of their offices a half hour before their shift was over yesterday and demonstrated peacefully in the streets. Until yesterday's action, the strike action had appeared to be tapering off. Certainly, this was the impression given by official communiques issued by the power companies, giving the public to understand that on account of the government's firm stand not to negotiate on any of the issues at stake and ^{its} intent to apply the severe penalties provided by anti-strike laws, the strike had been "busted" and work activities had returned to normality, or were in the process thereof. SEGBA condemned the kidnapping of its three employees, however, as a "disgraceful action", and asked for an investigation by the government security agencies. There has been no further news concerning the fate of the three.

5. According to union sources, union representatives proposed to both the Ministry ^{the Navy} and ~~Navy/Ministry~~ over the weekend that an ad hoc negotiating committee of six management representatives and six worker delegates meet to discuss the wide range of issues in dispute, including the recent dismissals, the clauses in the collective agreement which management deems to be prejudicial, and a sensible rationalization plan. Reportedly, the response from aides to Junta member and Commander of the Navy

Admiral Massera was that the government would only be willing to negotiate after the law unilaterally abrogating the portions of the collective contract had been issued. Ex Luz y Fuerza union secretary general Juan Jose Taccone, who appears, for all intents and purposes, to be leading the union at the moment, states that the union has ordered a strike of all employees in SEGBA's commercial offices and has also ordered a halt in all repair work, with the exception of that required by hospitals and other similar public facilities. Workers responsible to the union have been instructed to do everything they can to continue the supply of electric power, according to Taccone, i.e. the temporary cuts in service do not correspond to a

However, the union may be losing its ability to control worker actions, deliberate policy on the part of the union. / Taccone also reports (where a union leader was arrested)

Taccone admits.


that the strike action has spread to Rosario and to Bahia Blanca, and possibly to Salta as well. Other labor sources report that labor leaders representing a wide gamut of trade unions have offered to support Taccone if he decides to lead a general strike, but Taccone reportedly declined.

6. President Videla has been briefed at least once by the members of the Secretariat of Energy and SEGBA with regard to the conflict and separately by the Labor Minister. Curiously, the Labor Minister has taken the public position that the conflict is not within the competence of his Ministry, inasmuch as the Economy Ministry has sole jurisdiction over implementation of the Junta law providing for the rationalization (i.e. dismissal)

[of unnecessary personnel in state enterprises. According to union sources, Labor Ministry personnel privately admit that the conflict was precipitated by the Energy Subsecretariat's arbitrary and inept handling of the problem, lending further to the impression that the Labor Ministry has been ordered to stay out of the conflict. Ratifying speculation which has appeared in the press, however, Taccone believes that the Energy Secretariat may not have consulted with Economy Min Martinez de Hoz (who has been on an official trip abroad) before deciding to fire the union leaders as part of a presumed plan to effect substantial cuts in personnel levels. The Energy Secretariat's precipitous action has given rise to speculation in labor circles that SEGBA and the Energy Secretariat have the support of elements in the Navy which allegedly are seeking an appropriate banner under which to effect more severe changes in government labor policy, and perhaps a reshuffling of government leaders at the top echelon as well. While there has been a suggestion in scanty press accounts of the meeting Oct 7 between President Videla and state secretary of energy Zubaran that Videla was not pleased with the Secretariat and SEGBA's approach to the rationalization problem, the interpretation which has been given is that he had little choice but to accept the management's action as fait accompli, at least until now. The statements emanating from the Energy Secretariat following the briefing tended to support this conclusion.]

According to media accounts, the Energy Secretary stated that the President asked lots of questions, "and we answered them entirely to his satisfaction."

HILL



FBI

Date: 10/18/76

Transmit the following in _____

(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE

URGENT

(Precedence)

P18 15:00 Z OCT 76

FM BUENOS AIRES (109-2) (109-103) (P)

TO DIRECTOR (109-12-201) PRIORITY 221-18

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-ARGENTINA; IS-ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM-ARGENTINA.

OCTOBER 17, 1976 WAS THE ANNIVERSARY OF PERONIST LOYALTY
DAY, WHICH MARKED THE RELEASE OF FORMER ARGENTINE PRESIDENT JUAN
DOMINGO PERON FROM MILITARY CUSTODY ON OCTOBER 17, 1943, ALLOW-
ING HIM TO BE SUBSEQUENTLY ELECTED PRESIDENT OF ARGENTINA.
OCTOBER 17TH IS TRADITIONALLY CELEBRATED BY PERONISTS AND THEIR
SUPPORTERS THROUGHOUT ARGENTINA.

ON OCTOBER 17, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD WHO IS
AN OFFICIAL WITH THE STATE SECRETARIAT FOR INFORMATION (SIDE),
AN ARGENTINE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING
INFORMATION: (S) (U)

AT APPROXIMATELY 12:05 A.M.?, OCTOBER 17, 1976, A POWERFUL

- 5 - Bue (109-2)
 (1 - 109-103)
 (1 - 105-767 Montoneros)
 (1 - 80-84 [Dr. Poiré]) (S) (U)
 (1 - 80-217 [Carlos Vicente Marcotte]) (S) (U)

5-1-01
 CLASSIFIED BY: 39063 ELW/BCE/asm
 DECLASSIFY ON: (S) Argentina Projects
 appeal # 90-037A

RWS:gjk (5)

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____

M Per _____

12:00
10/18/76

109-2-1718

CLASSIFIED BY: 109-12-201
 BY DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
 DATE: 7-10-11 11:23 only

284394
 10-13-89
 071A A9J JC

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Precedence)PAGE TWO BUE 109-2 109-103 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BOMB MADE UP OF APPROXIMATELY FOUR KILOS OF TNT, WAS DETONATED BY AN AUTOMATIC TIMING DEVICE NEAR A RECREATION ROOM IN THE "CIRCULO MILITAR" (MILITARY CIRCLE), AN EXCLUSIVE CLUB FOR ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES OFFICERS IN DOWN TOWN BUENOS AIRES. AT THE TIME OF THE DETONATION, APPROXIMATELY 114 PERSONS, INCLUDING MILITARY OFFICERS AND THEIR FAMILIES, WERE VIEWING A FILM. FORTY-NINE INDIVIDUALS WERE INJURED AS A RESULT OF THE BOMBING, 19 BEING HOSPITALIZED. AMONG THE INJURED, WERE MANY WOMEN AND CHILDREN. TWO WOMEN LOST THEIR SIGHT DUE TO EXTENSIVE INJURIES RECEIVED. SHORTLY AFTER THE DETONATION, THE MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION TOOK CREDIT FOR THE BOMBING.

ON OCTOBER 17, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD WHO IS AN OFFICIAL OF THE FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA (FPA), DEPARTMENT OF FEDERAL SECURITY (INTELLIGENCE DIVISION), PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: ~~(S)~~ (U)

DURING THE LATE EVENING HOURS OF OCTOBER 17, 1976, NUMEROUS BOMB ATTACKS WERE CARRIED OUT THROUGHOUT THE CITY OF BUENOS AIRES BY UNIDENTIFIED TERRORISTS. THE PRINCIPAL TARGETS OF THESE BOMB ATTACKS WERE PARKED AUTOMOBILES AND BUSES, INCLUDING A COLOR TELEVISION TRANSMISSION TRUCK. A VEHICLE BELONGING TO THE U. S. ~~(S)~~ (U)

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____

M

Per _____

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Precedence)PAGE THREE BUE 109-2 109-103 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EMBASSY, BUENOS AIRES, BEARING DIPLOMATIC LICENSE TAGS, WAS
 ATTACKED BY AN ^{FIRE} ~~INCENDIARY~~ BOMB THROWN FROM A PASSING AUTOMOBILE.

THE U. S. EMBASSY VEHICLE WAS BEING DRIVEN BY A CHAUFFEUR WHO
 WAS UNHURT. MODERATE DAMAGE WAS CAUSED TO THE EMBASSY VEHICLE
 AS A RESULT OF THE ^{FIRE} BOMBING. NO TERRORIST GROUP HAS TAKEN CREDIT
 FOR THE AFOREMENTIONED ATTACK AGAINST THE U. S. EMBASSY VEHICLE. (S)(U)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931 XGDS-2 INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE:

THE EMBASSY VEHICLE WHICH WAS ATTACKED ON OCTOBER 17, 1976,
 BELONGED TO THE DEFENSE ATTACHE'S OFFICE OF THE EMBASSY. THE
 CHAUFFEUR WHO WAS DRIVING THE VEHICLE ADVISED HE DID NOT
 DETECT ANY SURVEILLANCE AND BELIEVES THAT HE WAS THE VICTIM OF A
 RANDOM ATTACK CARRIED OUT BY TERRORISTS.

LEGAT PERSONNEL ^{ARE} CONTINUE TO TAKE STRINGENT SECURITY
 PRECAUTIONS.

^{FIRST} SOURCES ^{IS} ARE DR. ARTURO H. POIRE, SIDE, ^{SECOND SOURCE} ^{IS} ~~XXXX~~ CARLOS
 VICENTE MARCOTTE, FPA. (S)(U)

COORDINATED LOCALLY.

BT

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
 Special Agent in Charge

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

TO : THE AMBASSADOR
MR. JOHN SEARS, POL/R

DATE: 10/19/76

FROM : *hux* LEGAL ATTACHE ROBERT W. SCHERRER

SUBJECT: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA;
FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA

Reference my memo 9/3/76, which reported on the abduction and assassination of JESUS CEJAS ARIAS and CRESENCIO GALANENA HERNANDEZ, two employees of the Cuban Embassy in Buenos Aires, by Argentine security forces during August, 1976.

On 9/18/76, a source, who is connected with one of the Argentine intelligence services, provided the following information: ~~(S)~~ (U)

After CEJAS and GALANENA had been assassinated, their bodies were cemented into one large storage drum and thrown into the Rio Lujan near Puente Colorado in San Fernando, Buenos Aires Province. The location where the two bodies were dumped had been used in the past to dispose of other bodies by the State Secretariat for Information (SIDE). The bodies of CEJAS and GALANENA were recovered on or about 10/14/76 by members of the San Fernando Volunteer Fire Department and frog men from the National Maritime Prefectura. Because CEJAS and GALANENA had been immersed in water for such a considerable period of time, facilitating rapid decomposition, it is doubtful that they will be identified. At the time CEJAS and GALANENA were recovered, several other bodies, apparent victims of SIDE operations, were also recovered from the Rio Lujan at the same approximate location. ~~(S)~~ (U)

This document should be returned to the office of the Legal Attache.

5-1-01
CLASSIFIED BY: 39063 E/W/BCE/sam
REASON: 1.5 (C,D)
DECLASSIFY ON: X1/b
Argentina Project

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

Classified by 5931
Exempt from General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category 5B(2)
Automatically declassified on Indefinite

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan



5010-110

1719

~~SECRET~~

~~EYES ONLY~~

THE AMBASSADOR
MR. JOHN SEARS, POL/R

10/19/76

LEGAL ATTACHE ROBERT W. SCHERRER

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA;
FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA

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This document should be returned to the office of the Legal Attache.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 07-18-2001 BY SP-1
OTHERWISE

5/1/01
CLASSIFIED BY: 39063 E/W BLC/sam
REASON: 1.5 (C, D)
DECLASSIFY ON: X1, 6
Argentine Project

~~SECRET~~

1 - Addressee
4 - Buenos Aires (109-2)
 (1 - 109-103)
 (1 - 109-5) (FPM, Cuba)
RWS:jn (1 - 80-84) (POIRE)
(5)

Classified by 5931
Exempt from General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652
Exemption Category 5B(2)
Automatically declassified on Indefinite

(S) (U)

FBI

Date: 10/20/76

Transmit the following in CODE
(Type in plaintext or code)Via CABLE PRIORITY
(Precedence)

P 20 Z OCT 76

FM BUENOS AIRES (109-2)(109-103)

TO DIRECTOR (109-12-201) PRIORITY

BT

~~SECRET~~

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA; IS - ARGENTINA;

ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM - ARGENTINA.

ON OCTOBER 20, 1976, AN OFFICIAL OF THE ARGENTINE ARMY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (AAIS) PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (S)(U)

ON OCTOBER 18, 1976, ELEMENTS OF THE AAIS, OPERATING WITH MEMBERS OF THE BUENOS AIRES PROVINCIAL POLICE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, DISCOVERED AND SUCCESSFULLY RAIDED A LOCATION IN BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE THAT HOUSED THE INTELLIGENCE RECORDS OF THE PEOPLES REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP), AN ARGENTINE TERRORIST ORGANIZATION. (S)(U)

VOLUMINOUS DOCUMENTS AND FILES WERE SEIZED AS A RESULT OF THIS RAID. THE ERP HAD GATHERED INFORMATION CONCERNING OVER 1,700 ARGENTINE ARMY OFFICERS, WHICH INCLUDED NAME, RANK, RESIDENCE AND ASSIGNMENT. MUCH OF THE INFORMATION REGARDING THESE ARGENTINE ARMY OFFICERS WAS SEVERAL YEARS OUT OF DATE. IN ADDITION DOCUMENTS WERE DISCOVERED INDICATING THAT THE ERP HAD GATHERED INFORMATION AGAINST PERSONNEL OF VARIOUS EMBASSIES IN ARGENTINA, INCLUDING (S)(U)

1 - ERP (109-38) 1 - 80-LUCERO (S)(U)

RWS:jn (4)

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____

M

Per _____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

-20

5-1-01
CLASSIFIED BY 3906381W/BCE
REASON: 1.5 (C, D)
DECLASSIFY ON: X1/E
Argentina Project

SRM

Classified by 2803 RDD/cal
Declassify on: OADR
2-24-99
90-2530

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED
BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE: 11-9-94 195143

109-2-1720

F B I

Date:

~~SECRET~~Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)PAGE TWO ~~SECRET~~ BUE 109-2 109-103THE UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN, AUSTRALIA, CANADA, FRANCE AND
SWEDEN. (~~S~~) (U)

INFORMATION REGARDING U. S. EMBASSY PERSONNEL WAS RELATED
TO THE FORMER AGRICULTURAL ATTACHE, THE FORMER MILITARY GROUP
COMMANDER, AND THE FORMER NAVAL ATTACHE. ALL OF THESE INDIVIDUALS
WERE REASSIGNED FROM ARGENTINA SEVERAL YEARS AGO. THE INCUMBENT
NAVAL ATTACHE CURRENTLY OCCUPIES THE SAME RESIDENCE AS HIS
PREDECESSOR, WHICH HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED BY THE ERP. THE ERP
DOCUMENTS ALSO CONTAIN THE RESULTS OF A CASING OPERATION AGAINST
AN AS YET UNIDENTIFIED FIRST SECRETARY OF THE U. S. EMBASSY,
WHO RESIDED IN LA LUCILA, BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE. (~~S~~) (U)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 5931 XGDS-2 INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE - THE FOREGOING INFORMATION IS EXCLUSIVE.
IT WILL BE COORDINATED LOCALLY.

[SOURCE IS MAJOR JUAN LUCERO, AAIS.] (~~S~~) (U)

BT

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

F B I

Date: 11/3/76

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via TELETYPE _____
(Precedence)

P 03 Z NOV 76

FM BUENOS AIRES (109-2) (109-103)

TO DIRECTOR (109-12-201) PRIORITY -03

BT

E F T O

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - ARGENTINA; IS-ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM-ARGENTINA.

ON NOVEMBER 3, 1976, HERB LESHINSKY, CHRYSLER FEVRE,
ARGENTINA, MANAGING DIRECTOR, BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA, PROVIDED
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

AT 7:30 A.M., NOVEMBER 3, 1976, THREE TERRORISTS ^{OF THE} ~~CONNECTED~~
~~WITH THE~~ MONTONERO GUERRILLA ORGANIZATION ASSASSINATED CHRYSLER
FEVRE ARGENTINA'S LABORATORY MANAGER, CARLOS ROBERTO SOUTO,
OUTSIDE OF HIS RESIDENCE in CASTELLAR, BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE.
CHRYSLER FEVRE ARGENTINA IS THE ARGENTINE SUBSIDIARY OF THE
CHRYSLER CORPORATION IN DETROIT, MICHIGAN. SOUTO WAS AN
ARGENTINE CITIZEN.

ADMINISTRATIVE.

FOREGOING INFORMATION IS EXCLUSIVE AND WILL BE COORDINATED
LOCALLY.

BT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/25/01 BY 39003 E/w BcE/sam
argentina project

1 - Bue 109-2
1 - 109-103

1 - 105-767 Montoneros) RWS:gjk (3)

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

109-2-1726

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

THE AMBASSADOR
VIA DCM

11/3/76

LEGAL ATTACHE ROBERT W. SCHERRER

MONTONEROS

Reference my memo 11/1/76 under the above caption.

On 11/3/76, I was again contacted by HERB LESHINSKY, Chrysler South America Managing Director, who provided the following information:

During the late afternoon and evening of 11/2/76, various telephone calls were received at the residences of the 16 Chrysler executives and managers to whom the Montonero letter described in referenced memo had been directed. The callers identified themselves as Montoneros and indicated the purpose of their calls was to confirm receipt of the Montonero written communication.

During the evening of 11/2/76, twelve of the sixteen executives and Chrysler managers to whom the earlier Montonero communication had been directed, received packages through the Argentine postal service at their residences. The son of one of the Chrysler executives opened one of the packages and discovered that it contained a small coffin.

At 7:30 A.M., Chrysler Laboratory Manager, CARLOS ROBERTO SOUTO, was assassinated by Montoneros as he left his residence enroute to the Chrysler Plant in San Justo. SOUTO was a 41-year-old Argentine citizen, who was married with three children. According to information provided by SOUTO's wife, as her husband was backing his automobile out

- 1 - Addressee
 - 1 - POL
 - 1 - POL/R
 - 1 - ECONOMIC COUNSELOR
 - 1 - SY
 - 3 - Buenos Aires
 - (1) - 109-2)
 - (1 - 109-103)
 - (1 - 105-767)
- RWS:jn (8)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 5/3/01 BY 39063 E/N/BCI/sam
Argentina Project

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

109-2-1727

MONTONEROS

of the family residence in Castellar, Buenos Aires Province, two male individuals with stocking masks, armed with what was believed to be an Ithaca riot gun and a sub-machine gun, riddled her husband's car. Mrs. SOUTO ran out of her residence pleading with her husband's attackers to leave him alone. The attackers pointed their weapons at Mrs. SOUTO and she beat a hasty retreat back into her residence. She observed her husband's car veering and crashing into a neighbor's fence. The two armed individuals then went to the car, opened the driver's door and fired at her husband at point blank range. Mrs. SOUTO observed a third terrorist, who was in position down the street from the SOUTO residence. This terrorist was a female and also had her face covered with a stocking mask. After her husband had been assassinated, a Dodge 1500 red sedan entered the block at high speed and picked up the three terrorists.

10-16-2017

TELEGRAM

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

FROM

AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

CLASSIFICATION

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

E.O. 11652:
TAGS:
SUBJECT:

NA
~~ELAB~~ ELAB PINT AR
Buenos Aires Light and Power Workers Return to Normal Work Pace

ACTION:

SECSTATE WASHDC

AMB
DEM
POL-3
POL/R
ECON
USIS
USDAO
MIIGP2
SCIATT
LEGATT
RF
CHRON

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ BUENOS AIRES 7402

REF: BA 7103 and previous

1. SUMMARY. Notwithstanding a new flurry of sabotage actions, Buenos Aires' light and power workers are working normally now following the government's decision to crack down on the union about two weeks ago. While the union would appear to have retreated in the wake of the government action, union leader still prefers to see signs of hope that the government's position is being reassessed at the upper levels of the armed forces. END SUMMARY.

DRAFTED BY:

DRAFTING DATE

TEL. EXT.

CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:

CLEARANCES:

INDEXED
SERIALIZED FILED

NOV 11 1976

LEGAL ATTACHMENT - BUENOS AIRES

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~
CLASSIFICATION

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

TELEGRAM

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

FROM
 AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

CLASSIFICATION
~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

7402 P.2

E.O. 11652:

TAGS:

SUBJECT:

ACTION:

NA
 ELAB PINT AR
 Buenos Aires Light and Power Workers Return to Normal Work Pace

SECSTATE WASHDC

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE BUENOS AIRES~~

REF: BA 7103 and previous

2. Union sources have confirmed news reports that work activities have returned to their normal state at SEGBA and Italo-Argentina installations and maintenance crews are repairing machinery damaged during the strike. Although management representatives reported continued acts of sabotage (including bombings and several "accidents") along with power and water shortages last week, the "luz y fuerza" workers evidently worked at a more or less normal pace during most of the week, with the major exception being a one-day protest over the disappearance of a fellow worker named Enrique Balbuena and his wife. Presumed by the union to have been kidnapped by police agents, Balbuena was released after being tortured; his wife has not returned and is believed to be dead. Since the end of last week we have seen no further reports of sabotage, although service was still curtailed in some areas.

DRAFTED BY:

LABATT:AFreeman:jr

DRAFTING DATE

11/10/76

TEL. EXT.

124

CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:

POLCOUNS:W2Smith

CLEARANCES:

CHARGE:MChaplin

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 CLASSIFICATION

OPTIONAL FORM 10
 (Rev. 5-22-64)
 January 1965

a week ago as a result of the low level of maintenance during the strike.

3. While union representatives do not admit that they have been defeated, we believe that a combination of "get tough" measures announced by the government on Oct. 27 (see reftel) have forced the union and the workers to retreat, at least temporarily.

Following the issuance of the government communique of Oct. 27, military guards were doubled at the light and power installations and over 40 union members were arrested. There was a report that ex-local leader Oscar Smith was among those detained, but this proved to be false. Nevertheless, ex-members of the board of the local union believe there are orders out for their arrest and they are taking evasive measures to protect their movements. The union was also put on the defensive by a propaganda campaign launched by the government over TV and in the other media providing estimates of the property damage wrought during the strike, exhorting the workers to cease their allegedly anti-patriotic activities, and tending to blur in the public mind the distinction between strike ~~activities~~ activity ~~by~~ by the workers and terrorist acts by the guerrillas in the supposed name of a fictitious "CGT of resistance." As de facto "Luz y Fuerza" leader Juan Jose Taccone put it in a recent conversation, "a typical worker act of reprisal is to loosen a valve and let the leak oil/~~pour~~ out; the indiscriminate bombing of machinery and workers is totally alien to union history and is clearly the work of the

guerrillas." When a guerrilla commando unit stormed a TV station in La Plata by force last week and broadcast a message exhorting the workers to support the Luz y Fuerza strikers, the union felt obliged to issue a reply disassociating itself from the subversives' exhortation.

48. While the workers would appear to have suspended their protest action without any visible sign of achieving their objectives--not even with respect to their proposal to sit down with management and discuss the ~~issues~~ issues--Taccone maintains there is still hope that a way can be found out of the impasse.

He believes the fact that the draft law derogating portions of state enterprise collective contracts was not issued last week, as scheduled, is evidence that the union's message is getting through and that the issues are being reevaluated at the upper levels of the armed forces and the government. Reports that SEGBA is unilaterally reconsidering the most obvious cases of injustice committed, i.e. the inclusion in the dismissal lists of those within a few months of meeting the minimum requirements for retirement are another suggestion perhaps of a changing attitude. Taccone also asserts that journalists and other opinion leaders express astonishment when he shows them union data demonstrating that while SEGBA's output nearly doubled between 1966 and 1976 and its customers increased by more than 42%, the quantity of direct-hire personnel actually dropped somewhat (from 25,705 in 1966 to 25,402 in 1976). Such being

the case, Taccone says, the question is being asked in high places why SEGBA was chosen to be among the first state enterprises to be subjected to a rationalization of personnel. However, we should add that with the exception of the earlier articles in "La Opinion", which we have already reported, we have seen few signs in the media in recent days that the union's position is beginning to take hold of public opinion.

CHAPLIN

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~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

~~Classification~~

11/15/76

~~SECRET~~

CABLE

URGENT

P 15 Z 76

FM BUENOS AIRES (109-9) (109-2) (P)

TO DIRECTOR PRIORITY -15

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS-CHILE; IS-CHILE; FPM-ARGENTINA;
IS-ARGENTINA; ARGENTINE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; FPM-ARGENTINA.

ON NOVEMBER 14, 1976, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ABROAD WHO IS
AN OFFICIAL OF THE FEDERAL POLICE OF ARGENTINA (FPA), INTELLIGENCE
DIVISION, PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (S) (U)

DURING THE EVENING OF NOVEMBER 13, 1976, TERRORISTS
MACHINE GUNNED AND SET OFF INCENDIARY BOMBS AT THE RESIDENCE
OF JAIME VALDEZ, PRESS ATTACHE OF THE CHILEAN EMBASSY IN BUENOS
AIRES. MODERATE DAMAGE WAS DONE TO THE VALDEZ RESIDENCE
WHICH IS LOCATED IN SAN ISIDRO, BUENOS AIRES PROVINCE.
VALDEZ' AUTOMOBILE, WHICH WAS PARKED OUTSIDE THE RESIDENCE,
WAS SEVERELY DAMAGED. VALDEZ WAS NOT AT HOME WHEN THE ATTACK
TOOK PLACE INASMUCH AS HE WAS ACCOMPANYING ARGENTINE PRESIDENT
RAFAEL JORGE VIDELA ON A STATE VISIT TO CHILE.

AS OF NOVEMBER 14, 1976, NO TERRORIST ORGANIZATION HAD
CLAIMED CREDIT FOR THE BOMBING.

5 - Bue (109-9 FPM-Chile) 109-2, 109-103
157-35 (Chilbom) 80-27 (Com. Mayor Marcotte) (S) (U)

RWS:gjk (5)

~~SECRET~~

109-2-1732

~~SECRET~~

PAGE TWO BUE 109-9; 109-2 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

~~CLASSIFIED BY 59X1, XGDS-2 INDEFINITE.~~

ADMINISTRATIVE:

SOURCE IS COMISARIO MAYOR CARLOS VICENTE MARCOTTE, DEPUTY
DIRECTOR OF FEDERAL SECURITY, FPA. (~~S~~) (U)

COORDINATED LOCALLY.

WHILE THERE IS NO APPARENT CONNECTION WITH THE ABOVE-
DESCRIBED BOMBING ATTACK AND THE ASSASSINATION OF ORLANDO
LETELIER, IT IS SUGGESTED THAT THE BUREAU PROVIDE A COPY OF
THIS CABLE TO WFO AND OTHER OFFICES HANDLING LEADS IN THE
CHILBOM CASE IN CONNECTION WITH CHILEAN EXILE
COMMUNITIES IN THEIR TERRITORIES.

BT

~~SECRET~~

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

— P. 8 and 9

BUENOS AIRES HERALD

11/25/76

Date:

Edition:

Author:

Editor:

Title:

Character:

or

Classification: 109-2-1733

Submitting Office:

☐ Being Investigated

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5-8-01 BY 39063 ELN/RCE/50m
Argentina Project

SEARCHED.....	INDEXED.....
SERIALIZED.....	FILED.....
NOV 27 1976	
FBI - NEW YORK	

1 Recd

Perón's savage legacy

● The following article, reprinted from the Daily Telegraph, is one of the most balanced reports written so far on the complex situation in Argentina today. Extracts from it have been issued by the government's own news agency Telam. Michael Field, currently Paris bureau chief, spent several years in Latin America for the Daily Telegraph and also reported on the Vietnam War.

by Michael Field

THE Marxist left, whose publicists have filled the vacuum caused by the disinterest in Latin America of less committed observers, has had a field day since September 11, 1973. This, in case you have forgotten, was the day that the Chilean armed forces, with much more popular support than is now remembered, overthrew the late President Salvador Allende and ended "the Chilean road to Socialism".

It was a historic moment. Allende's imprudence in pushing too hard, too far and too fast with revolutionary plans for which he had insufficient mandate (a third of the vote) is constantly recalled by Mr Berlinguer, the Italian Communist leader, and can hardly be absent from the thoughts of Mr Francois Mitterrand, the French Socialist, who is looking forward to the triumph of the Socialist-Communist front in the French parliamentary elections in 1976. "The Chilean example" has entered the annals of the left as a classic warning.

Thwarted by the coup, their hatred fed by thousands of Chilean exiles in Europe and the United States, the international left and its liberal camp-followers have decreed and achieved the almost universal moral ostracism of the present régime in Santiago. The military have helped; the harshness of the new order, its slow resolution of economic problems (inherited from Allende and exacerbated by world economic conditions), above all its unique, strange ideology, have played into its critics' hands. Chile has become a dirty word.

This accomplished, the West's do-gooders, silent for so long about social conditions in South America, are now turning their attention to Argentina, which, on March 24, threw off—finally it is fervently to be hoped—the incubus of Peronism, a native populism with its roots in pre-war Fascism. Under a firm military hand, the country has embarked on "national reorganisation".

The aim of the Argentine junta, led by Lt General Jorge R. Videla, is practical and lacks the bombast of earlier "revolutions". Simply, it is the establishment (though not just yet) of "a serious republican democracy" to replace the corrupt fraud of Peronism which has frustrated the hopes of its mass supporters in two generations and twice almost ruined one of the richest countries in the world.

The proof of the general's pudding will, of course, be in the eating. There is also always the risk that President Videla, a kindly, devoutly religious man, could be set aside by ambitious, more authoritarian colleagues. Argentines are impatient and excitable. Already there are signs that the misdeeds of the last year under President Maria Estela Peron and her gun-toting Mafia of corrupt union leaders and other favourites are slipping from many minds. Real income has declined and, as always, the less-favoured feel that they are bearing more than a fair share of the strain of economic adjustment.

Nevertheless, and for what it means in such a distressing record, the present government is the most promising that Argentina has seen since the overthrow of Peron in 1955. It has yet to show that it can really control the unruly unions without excessive force and without yielding to them in exchange for insincere promises of co-operation. This is as crucial a matter as winning the war against the Marxist guerrillas.

But there is a serious threat to the new government's national and international credibility and repute in its failure so

far to end the sinister sequence of political revenge killings which developed under Peronism. Despite President Videla's frequent assertion that the use of force must be a government monopoly, there is still much evidence that it is not. The US congress, which has already condemned Chile and Uruguay for consistent violation of human rights, is now moving towards a similar denunciation of Argentina—helped, incidentally, by politically interested witnesses. Amnesty International has mobilised its hosts in a one-sided campaign against the authorities.

These political humanitarians appear to have no sympathy at all for the victims of terrorist bombings, kidnappings and the families of policemen and members of the armed forces gunned down in what the extremists call the "struggle for national liberation".

"Police brutality" undoubtedly exists. Savagery breeds savagery and an atmosphere of hatred and revenge has been growing in Argentina for a decade, its roots in the divisions encouraged by the late President Perón, surely one of the most irresponsible national leaders to have emerged in any country.

"If I were young, I too would be throwing bombs", he said in the luxury of his Madrid exile when the guerrilla movements began to form in the late 1960s, and promptly armed and financed them. One group, the Montoneros, professing Peronism and containing elements of the former Argentine Nazi group, the Tacuara, was even legalised after his return. Its militants attended mass rallies in Buenos Aires carrying banners boasting that they had "executed" the former President, General Pedro Aramburu, in 1969. Such flagrant illegality, protected by the state, could hardly fail to provoke equally illicit reaction. "Death squads", like the notorious anti-communist "Triple A" are the only human response.

(Continued on page 9)



● Figure, by Alberto Zienkiewicz.

Bligh's log : £ 55,000

London
AN ANONYMOUS buyer yesterday paid £55,000 at a Christie's auction for the log kept in 1789 by Captain William Bligh after he was set adrift in a small boat by mutineers on his ship, the Bounty.

The leather-bound pocket book, with many of its 107 closely-written pages stained with the salt spray of the South Seas, described the epic 3,500-mile voyage in the ship's launch. It provided the most complete account of Bligh's six-week journey from Tofua in the mid-Pacific, where he was set down by the mutineers, to Timor, an island in Indonesia.

The recently unearthed log had been preserved in the Bligh family, unknown to historians, since the captain's death in 1817. The descendant who put it on sale wished to remain anonymous.

William Bligh gave in his log the list of the 25 mutineers led by Fletcher Christian, who was portrayed by Clark Gable in a 1930 film version and by Marlon Brando in a later remake (Reuters)

Half-a-block-from-calle Florida, you are welcome to visit GALATEA, book shop & art gallery, located at calle Viamonte 564.

At the moment you will find an exhibit of the painter Vázquez-Málaga, an excellent exponent of real and realistic Argentine mes. Weekday and 3-8 hs. Saturdays: 9-1 hs.

transforms and experiments, and strong vibrant colours give place to delicate tones, depending upon his emotional response. This indicates healthy vitality and mental growth, and is a self-searching for original expression, not of the material world, but an attempt to unite figures and landscapes with his own inner vision.

At Palatina Gallery, Arroyo 821, Raúl Soldi shows large, decorative, oil panels (dated 1955-57 of romantic figures with birds and flowers) as well as recent original porcelains. He is now combining creative and artisan activity. Soldi, a successor of Victorica as an "Intimist", achieved his fame through a sensuously lyric and poetically musical subject matter and technique. This carries-through in his porcelains, which are at times reminiscent of Classical and Oriental influences.



● Above: By Alberto Zienkiewicz, "Roquel".

Crossword Puzzle

Answer to Wedn
Puzzle



ACROSS

- 1 Bitter vetch
- 4 Nimbus
- 8 Ugly, old women
- 12 Sign of zodiac
- 13 Mountains of Europe
- 14 Chills and fever
- 15 Prefix: bad
- 16 Repugnant
- 18 Fascination
- 20 Chimney carbon
- 21 Ready money
- 23 Showy flower
- 27 Lure
- 29 Dry
- 32 Gild's high note
- 33 Otherwise
- 34 Nothing
- 35 Decorate
- 38 Scottish cap
- 37 Sacred image
- 38 Macaws
- 39 Malicious
- 41 Hindu woman's garment
- 43 Walk unsteadily
- 46 Memoranda
- 49 Transmitting
- 53 Native metal

DOWN

- 54 S-shaped molding
- 55 Sea in Asia
- 56 Inlet
- 57 South African Dutch
- 58 Wise person
- 59 Still
- 1 Shade trees
- 2 Harvest
- 3 Speech blunders
- 4 Tosses
- 5 Exist
- 6 Turns around track
- 7 Butter substitute (colloq.)
- 8 Stops
- 9 Mature
- 10 Weapon
- 11 Deposit
- 17 Burden
- 19 Tardy
- 22 Workman
- 24 Tract of land
- 25 Lamb's pen name
- 26 Male sheep (pl.)
- 27 Greek letter
- 28 Winglike
- 30 Spanish for "river"
- 31 Misfortunes
- 35 Edible rootstock

- 37 Arrow poison
- 40 Command
- 42 Corner
- 44 Periods of time
- 45 Unit of Italian currency
- 47 Great Lake
- 48 Chair
- 49 Take it legally
- 50 The self
- 51 Born
- 52 Scold



Distr. by United Feature Syndicate, Inc.

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Nobody cares about murdered policemen

(Continued from page 8)

The cold-blooded cruelty of the Argentine guerrillas has received little or no attention in human rights circles. Who knows or cares about Argentine professional soldiers kidnapped by these young "idealists" and really tortured, not beaten up, in the cause of "class warfare"? One example was that of Colonel Larrabure, an army weapons expert, murdered in cold blood after over a year's confinement in a "people's prison" beneath a cup-board in a small shop in the suburbs of Rosario. A chronic asthmatic, he was denied proper medicine. His cell had one small air vent and he had no room for exercise.

Captured papers after the discovery of his body included a daily diary on the prisoner's morale and health, coolly kept by a girl guerrilla. His crime, apart from membership of the army, was to have refused to help the terrorists with weapons and bomb manufacture. This is only one of a long list of official grievances which have provoked reciprocal hatred and cruelty leading to those halfburnt bodies on the rubbish dumps of Buenos Aires, the mutilated corpses found floating in the rivers and the butchery of "left-wing" priests.

The military, holding now the whip hand, have an obligation to the country and its friends to break this vicious circle. The hard-pressed police force is usually blamed for the worst crimes but there is little doubt that all branches of the services have their share of guilt. Exem-

plary punishment? There is no sign of it yet, though it is always promised. Mysterious kidnappings in lieu of formal arrests are still frequent and unexplained. General Harguindeguy, the genial, polo-playing Minister of the Interior, calls the "avengers" "mentally alienated", and their acts "totally to be repudiated. Extremists of right and left are the enemy. We shall get rid of them".

But the cleaning up process is too slow, especially as the guerrillas now have their backs to the wall and seem doomed, as in Brazil and Uruguay. It does not help to have Mrs Judith Hart and others, constantly worrying about the welfare of political kidnappers and murderers like former members of the Tupamaros (the jailers of Sir Geoffrey Jackson, former British Ambassador to Uruguay) and urging their transfer to Britain as political refugees because their "security" is threatened by Argentine repression.

The onus is nevertheless on President Videla, whose promise to restore the process of law has yet to be made good. The slow military bureaucracy could be speeded up. Political detainees, reported to number about 5,000, ought to be charged or released. Execution, when merited — there is still a war going on — may sometimes be justified. But the continuing "disposal" of prisoners cannot be defended and may lead Argentina into the limbo of world disapproval. It would be one more moral victory for the Marxists and their allies.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

Date:
 Edition:
 Author:
 Editor:
 Title:

Character:
 or
 Classification:
 Submitting Office:
☐ Being Investigated

DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

CONTROL: 1199
14 FEB 77
1658

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

FROM

AmEmbassy BUENOS AIRES

CLASSIFICATION

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

E.O. 11652:

TAGS:

SUBJECT:

N/A

ELAB, AR

Local Power Union Leader Disappears

ACTION:

SecState WASHDC ' IMMEDIATE

INFO:

USMission GENEVA

USMission EC BRUSSELS

REF:

Buenos Aires 1166

1. Oscar Smith, former Secretary General of the Federal Capital local of the Luz y Fuerza union, disappeared last Friday morning after leaving his house on his way to a union installation. As we reported reftel, Smith was instrumental in reaching an understanding with Labor Minister Liendo which led to the suspension of the recent conflict in the light and power industry. According to one report, Smith's car was blocked off at an intersection by armed men in three other vehicles who then whisked him and his auto away. Coincidentally, there was a rash of bombings in light and power union installations over the weekend.

2. Three alternate possibilities are being discussed as explaining his disappearance: (a) He was kidnapped by leftist

DRAFTED BY:

ABATT:AGFreemg

DRAFTING DATE

2/14/77

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CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:

POL:WSSmith

CLEARANCES:

AMB:RChill

DCM:MChaplin

terrorists in retaliation for his alleged betrayal of the workers by reaching a compromise solution with the government;

(b) he was kidnapped by a paramilitary or parapolice group acting under the instructions of ^{hardlining} ~~hardline~~ elements of the armed forces in order to ^{coerce and/or} ~~perhaps including~~ interrogate Smith, about his links with the Labor Minister; or (c) he "pulled a powder" in light of some rank and file discontent with the decision to go back to work. Some albeit veiled commentary in the weekend's press seems to suggest that the second theory is the prevailing one at the moment.

3. Light and power union leaders have sent messages to leading government figures protesting Smith's disappearance and demanding an immediate investigation. They have also, according to press reports, sent messages to the ILO, the ICTU and to the AFL-CIO asking for expressions of solidarity.

4. According to press reports, the military interventor of the Buenos Aires union local ~~NYM~~ (an Army colonel) authorized the light and power workers to walk off their jobs early this past Saturday in protest against the disappearance of Smith.

HILL


14 JUN 77

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

CLASSIFICATION

GDS

Argentine Human Rights Situation: A GENERAL REVIEW

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUENOS AIRES 4442

ominous. Argentine citizens continue to "disappear",

and security forces (who are now acknowledged to be in

complete control of the counter-terrorist effort) continue

to use harsh and arbitrary methods against suspects, including

illegal abductions, prolonged detentions and torture. These

methods have also applied to persons suspected of economic

corruption and breaking political censorship laws, although

most of these cases have eventually been assigned either to

military or civilian courts. On the positive side, increasing

numbers of detainees are being listed as being in the hands

of the Executive and authorized to leave the country, ~~Press XXXX~~

~~VAN HENX HAS DEMONSTRATED SOME SUCCESS TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY.~~

CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:
POL:WHallman

CHARGE: MChaplin

JUN 15 1971

CLASSIFICATION

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
(Formerly FD-301a)
JULY 1973
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

President Videla has demonstrated some success in curbing the hardline zeal for a ~~monarchical~~ takeover over ^{of} the government, ~~xxx~~ the Church and courts are increasingly speaking out on the human rights problem, and there is an indication the military may establish a "rehabilitation program" in which marginally involved members of subversive organizations will be turned over to the courts for legal processing. The Videla govt continues to appear to have a moderating influence on internal political and security matters and remains probably the most acceptable and only alternative to a more repressive regime espoused by military hardliners. END SUMMARY.

While it is difficult to distinguish a specific trend in human rights practices in Argentina, certain observations can be made:

1. In general, the methods adopted by the security forces in the anti-subversive campaign remain arbitrary and harsh.

Persons continue to be abducted by armed men claiming to be police and military officials. Families are ~~xxx~~ rarely or only belatedly informed about the whereabouts and status of their detained relatives. Persons detained incommunicado are regularly subjected to both physical and psychological torture during detention and interrogation sessions. Terrorist combatants are systematically eliminated. Others are secretly kept at the disposition of the Armed Forces or police until further information is available or a decision is made concerning the individual. Some of these persons may be killed as militant

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Classification

terrorists; others may be released after being threatened to keep quiet about their experiences; others may eventually be listed as persons detained at the disposition of the Executive (Poder Ejecutivo Nacional--PEN) and detained in regular prisons where normally they can receive family visits, lawyers, and reasonable food and treatment.

2. Recently, kinds of arrests under PEN have widened. Whereas previously most of those detained--either illegally or under state of siege provisions--fell into the category of terrorist ~~or~~ subversives, now persons are detained under PEN for economic "subversion", infractions of political censorship laws, ~~economic~~ ~~infractions of political censorship laws, economic~~ corruption, malfeasance and improper execution of one's public responsibilities (such as in the case of Gen. Lanusse charged in the Aluar case). Many of these persons were detained with the same disregard for due process: arrested without warrant, roughly treated during detention, held incommunicado for some time before families and lawyers were notified, held under vague accusations by the Executive without the filing of formal charges. These actions involved many important journalists and public figures, also businessmen and well known figures in the Jewish community, giving rise to considerable concern that a vast right-wing purge was being launched against anyone vaguely suspected of subversive ~~or~~ "inappropriate" attitudes as defined by hard-line elements in the Armed Forces and police. Time has assuaged some of these

fears, as Videla has managed to cool some of the more strident rhetoric and hard-line sensationalism surrounding recent economic and political scandals. The Graiver case was assigned to Army General Gallino who has completed his investigation quietly and submitted his findings to First Corps Commander Suarez Mason. Reportedly the military will determine which aspects of the case will be turned over to military courts (probably those involving allegations of subversive links) and which to the regular criminal courts (presumably those involving economic infractions). The Aluar case is currently in the hands of an appeals court which is reviewing the handling of the preliminary investigative stage by Federal Judge Marquardt. The relaxing of these two explosive issues, as well as recent diplomatic successes in Venezuela and among his own military colleagues, seem to have strengthened Videla's hand over hard-line factions within the military. There is unconfirmed information that Videla wants economic cases to be distinguished from subversive crimes and handled by normal civilian justice procedures.

3. The security forces appear to have assumed complete control of the counter-terrorism effort and the military govt must be considered fully responsible for internal security efficiency and practices. There are no para-police or para-military bands operating out of control of authorities; the Triple A has been dispersed and its members jailed for common crimes. President Videla is aware of and, in general terms, approves of methods

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used to combat terrorism and eliminate its combatant members.

There appears to be no dispute over this goal of the three Armed Forces. Videla, however, has acknowledged and expressed public concern over "excesses in repression by the forces of order" (press conference in Venezuela on May 12), and the failure of the govt to stem the continuing disappearance of Argentine citizens. Various units of the three armed forces and the police are known to keep their own "prisoners" whose identities, status and final disposition are not always reported or subject to the president's immediate control. Videla himself is believed to regret this situation but remains unable or unwilling to confront his own corps commanders or other branches over their conduct of the war against terrorism in their own areas. He is believed to exercise a moderating influence, however, and has probably curbed more violent and widespread human rights abuses by his espousal of moderation, his support for the Church, his ability to defuse political maneuvering by hard-line factions, and his relative ~~ne~~ openness and sensitivity to international opinion.

4. The battle against armed terrorism is almost won. The capability ~~for~~ ^{of} terrorist groups to launch major armed attacks has been destroyed and approximately 80 per cent of the combative strength of both the ERP and Montoneros has been wiped out. GOA estimates approximately 100 ERP combatants and 500-1000 Montonero militants remain at large. Improved counter-terrorism efficiency, centralized computerized intelligence and the breakdown of the terrorist

[groups' communications network, arms factories, sources of funds and coordination of cells have sped the demise of terrorist strength within Argentina.]

5. Spectacular incidents including the murder of five Catholic priests and the bombing of 30 bodies in Pilar in mid-1976 have largely ceased. Refugees, some members of the Jewish community, teachers, professionals and other groups continue to be harassed by overly zealous and irresponsible elements in the security forces and possibly other right-wing fanatics but do not appear to be singled out for systematic and officially deliberate repression. On the other hand, members of the Communist party, student groups, journalists and psychologists have figured significantly among those persons reportedly disappeared or summarily detained under PEN in recent weeks.

6. The subject of human rights abuses, disappearances and general concern over the internal security situation ~~xxx~~ is being aired more openly in recent months. The Bishops Conference document denouncing torture, disappearances and human rights abuses was acknowledged by Videla and other govt officials and in newspaper editorials. The Supreme Court and federal courts have taken the Executive to task for unsatisfactory responses to habeas corpus inquiries and judicial orders. (The Executive, however, apparently continues to ignore or appeal court decisions on security cases.) A court has declared the ban against the Divine Light Mission unconstitutional--the govt appealed; another court protected

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Jehovahs Witnesses schoolchildren from discrimination in enrolling in public schools. Newspapers, including the pro-government LA NACION, have written editorials commending the courts' defense of the right of habeas corpus and Videla's frank exposition on human rights problems in Argentina.

COMMENT: The human rights situation in Argentina has seen improvement in some areas and a disturbing trend toward "institutionalization" of arbitrary and abusive treatment on the part of govt and military officials on the other. The expansion of illegal and prolonged detentions for economic and ideological "crimes" is worrisome; how quickly and fairly the Graiver and Aluar cases are resolved, also those involving for example Jacobo Timerman for economic crimes and Robert Cox for violating censorship laws, should help indicate whether such arbitrary and sensational actions have grown out of control. What is now clear is that the Armed Forces are committed to elimination of all terrorist combatants--all those "with blood on their hands", regardless of whether ^{effected} ~~effected~~ during un-
acknowledged ^{detention} ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ or interrogation of suspects, or in shootouts with security forces during raids or identification checks. ^{Some} ~~Some~~ possibly innocent or marginally involved persons ^{could possibly be} ~~are likely to be~~ caught in this effort. Recently there have been indications that the military is considering a "rehabilitation" program for persons believed to be only marginally involved with terrorist organizations. These persons might, after

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(Classification)

interrogation and investigation, be turned over to the special military tribunals or criminal courts for legal processing.

Such a program would be a move toward observation of due process and constitutional ~~guarantees~~ ^{guarantees} and would mark, despite the significant successes in the anti-insurgency effort, the only improvement in terms of counter terrorist methods. The political and thus the human rights situations continue to be delicate and fluid. Fallout from strong US initiatives to demonstrate US concern over human rights has subsided temporarily; ~~against before~~ ^{and} ~~the government~~ certain positions and attitudes of the govt have become more clear: Argentine sovereignty and opposition to US interference in internal affairs will be staunchly defended; terrorists will be eliminated; Argentina's defense to human rights criticism will be that it is misunderstood, misrepresented and the object of a defamation campaign orchestrated from leftist agents abroad. At the same time, Videla is seeking to establish his moderate position; some notorious hardliners have been or will be retired, or at least partially neutralized; greater numbers of Argentine citizens are being listed as released from PEN and authorized to leave the country; the myth of para-military free-lance agents has been laid to rest and the govt is beginning to acknowledge internal security abuses and some limited criticism from the Church and courts.

CHAPLIN



CONTROL: 4679

23 JUN 77
1645

DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

FROM
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES.

CLASSIFICATION
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: SHUM, AR
SUBJECT: Jewish Leader Leaves Argentina After Threats

ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUENOS AIRES 4679

L I M D I S

CHARGE
POL3
RSO
~~CHRON~~
LEGATT

1. SUMMARY: Mrs. Jacobo Kovadloff told Emboff today (June 23) that her husband ^{had} ~~has~~ left suddenly for Brazil yesterday after receiving threats against his life. A subsequent anonymous note and telephone call ordered her also to leave Argentina with her children. She is preparing to leave. Mrs. Kovadloff asked Embassy and Department not rpt not to divulge any information on this matter until she is safely out of (all Argentine citizens) Argentina. Kovadloffs may go on ~~to~~ to US, but may also decide to wait out their difficulties in Brazil. END SUMMARY.

2. Jacobo Kovadloff, American Jewish Committee (AJC) representative, left Argentina suddenly for Brazil yesterday (June 22) after being followed and receiving phone and letter threats against his life. According to Mrs. Kovadloff, who spoke with Emboff June 23, unidentified persons began

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109-100

DRAFTED BY:
POL:YThayer:gcr

DRAFTING DATE
6-23-77

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CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:
CHARGE:MChaplin

CLEARANCES:
POL:WHHallman

FBI-BUENOS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECLASSIFICATION

OPTIONAL FORM 152(H)
(Formerly FS-413(H))
January 1975

calling and leaving scrawled ^{notes} ~~noted~~ in Kovadloff's apartment building on June 20 ordering him to close down the AJC office here and to leave Argentina "before it is too late." The first note read: "Traitor, you've played both ends for too long. Get out before it's too late. We don't want Yankee and Jewish offices here."

3. The Kovadloffs were apparently followed to the airport at the time of Mr. Kovadloff's June 22 departure and when Mrs. Kovadloff returned she found another note, this time addressed to herself, threatening her and her children and ordering them to leave the country immediately also. In a telephone call she was told not to go "running around talking to her amiguitos" which she took to mean the US Embassy and other Kovadloff contacts.

4. Mrs. Kovadloff said she believes uncontrolled hostile elements of the military or police are responsible, and she does not intend to report the incident to local authorities--or to anyone else, including the Israeli Embassy. She added that her husband did not believe his close contacts with Admiral Massera or other high ranking officers could protect him from harm.

5. Kovadloff ~~feeling~~ had not felt himself to be seriously threatened before this incident, she said, and she speculated that his efforts in the US to bring attention to Jacobo Timerman's detention (former editor to LA OPINION) could have

had something to do with the present threats.

6. Mrs. Kovadloff said she intends to leave Argentina as quickly as possible, probably first to Brazil and then possibly on to the US. She asked that neither the Embassy nor the Department divulge this information until she is safely out of the country. She added that the post-Graiver panic among the Jewish community had largely subsided and she was fearful the community would be again upset when the reason behind the Kovadloffs' departure is known. She repeated her husband's frequent observation that anti-Semitism, per se, is not a major human rights problem in Argentina, but rather, one more manifestation of general repression and lawlessness in the country.

7. Given strong suggestion threats are provocation by extreme right, Embassy is seeking Mrs. Kovadloff's agreement to call with Chargé on Minister of Government to explain circumstances and request protection. If this effort does not prosper, situation will call for strong US representation before Argentine Government here, and to Argentine Embassy in Washington. We must, however, meanwhile observe our pledge to respect Mrs. Kovadloff's request for secrecy until she is safely away from Argentina.

CHAPLIN *mc*

Classification

CONTROL: 5943

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1420

TELEGRAM

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

FROM

AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

CLASSIFICATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

E.O. 11652:

TAGS:

SUBJECT:

GDS

SHUM, PFOR, EFIN, AR

DERIAN VISIT WITH ECONOMY MINISTER MARTINEZ DE HOZ

ACTION:

SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO:

AMEMBASSY ASUNCION

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

AMEMBASSY LA PAZ

AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO

AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO

CHARGE

POL-3

POL/R

ECOM

USIS

AGATT

LEGATT

DAO

DEA

MILGP

ADMIN

RE

CHRON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUENOS AIRES: 5943

1. SUMMARY: COORDINATOR FOR HUMAN RIGHTS MET WITH ECONOMY MINISTER

AT SUGGESTION OF ARGENTINE AMBASSADOR TO U.S. MINISTER STARTED

WITH A DESCRIPTION OF THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS FACING

THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND FROM THERE LED THE DISCUSSION TO THE

TOPIC OF THE CURRENT HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN ARGENTINA. HE

STRESSED THAT PROGRESS WAS BEING MADE, AND THAT WHILE IRREGULAR

METHODS WERE STILL OCCASIONALLY EMPLOYED AGAINST A CONTINUING

THREAT, THE TREND WAS FOR RE-INSTITUTION OF DUE PROCESS. MRS.

DERIAN URGED THE GOVERNMENT TO SHOW ITS STRENGTH BY INSTITUTING

LEGAL METHODS AND APPEALING TO THE PEOPLE FOR SUPPORT. SHE

WARNED THAT TIME MAY BE RUNNING OUT BOTH INTERNALLY AND

INTERNATIONALLY.

2. POLITICAL FACTORS - THE MINISTER DESCRIBED THE

DRAFTED BY:

D/HA:MBova:eg

DRAFTING DATE

8/11/77

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CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:

CHARGE:MChaplin

CLEARANCES:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATION

OPTIONAL FORM 10-41
(Formerly FS-413-41)
January 1975
Dept of State

POLITICAL HISTORY OF ARGENTINA, MARKED BY SUCCESSIVE TAKEOVERS OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN GOVERNMENTS WHICH HAS MADE LONG RANGE ECONOMIC PLANNING IMPOSSIBLE. HE WAS HOPEFUL THAT IF CURRENT GOVERNMENT, WHICH HE FEELS HAS LEARNED FROM THE MISTAKES OF PRIOR GOVERNMENTS, COULD REMAIN IN POWER AT LEAST THREE YEARS MORE THE AN EVEN NEEDED STABILITY TO KEEP THE ECONOMY MOVING ON/KEEL WOULD BE ACHIEVED. HE SAID THAT THE ARGENTINE MILITARY HAS TRADITIONALLY NOT SOUGHT PERMANENT POWER AND THEIR ~~CONSCIENTIOUS~~ CONSCIENCES DICTATE EVENTUAL RETURN TO CIVILIAN DEMOCRATIC RULE. HE STRESSED THAT THIS PROCESS HAS ALREADY BEGUN WITH PRESIDENT VIDELA'S CALL COUNTRY FOR A DIALOGUE WITH VARIOUS INTEREST GROUPS IN THE ~~CONSTITUTION~~, WHICH WOULD HOPEFULLY LEAD TO THE REALIZATION OF THE NEED FOR POLITICAL REALISM, PERHAPS LEADING TO THE FORMATION OF TWO STRONG PARTIES, THE ONE MIDDLE OF THE ROAD AND ONE MORE TO THE LEFT, WHICH WOULD REFLECT THE TWO MAIN STREAMS OF ARGENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT. HE LAMENTED THE TRADITIONALLY FRACTURED NATURE OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN ARGENTINA CAUSED BY FREQUENCY OF ELECTIONS, PERSONALIZED NATURE OF POLITICS AND LACK OF DIRECT PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION, WHICH MIGHT ENCOURAGE GREATER RESPONSIBILITY. ON LATTER POINT, HOWEVER, HE DESCRIBED ARGENTINA'S PREVIOUS ATTEMPT AT PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION AS A FAILURE BECAUSE OF THE LARGE NUMBER OF PARTIES PARTICIPATING IN THE PROCESS. HE DESCRIBED CURRENT POLITICAL LEADERS AS HAVING A PRE-WORLD WAR II MENTALITY AND CRITICIZED THE TRADITIONAL PARTIES FOR NOT ALLOWING YOUNG PEOPLE TO RISE TO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

OPTIONAL FORM 100A
(Formerly FS 410A)
January 1975
Dept. of State

THE TOP.

3. ECONOMIC FACTORS - AFTER DESCRIBING THE ECONOMIC CHAOS INHERITED BY THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT, THE MINISTER WENT ON TO DESCRIBE HIS PROGRAM WHICH INCLUDES A RESTRUCTURING AND ENFORCEMENT OF TAX PROGRAMS, BREAKING THE RUNAWAY INFLATION, MOVING TO BALANCE THE BUDGET BY ELIMINATING INEFFICIENT STATE ENTERPRISES, ELIMINATING PRICE CONTROLS TO STIMULATE PRODUCTION AND PURSUING A RELATIVE CONTAINMENT OF SALARIES. THE LATTER POLICY IS ALSO GEARED AT PREVENTING UNEMPLOYMENT WHICH, THE MINISTER DESCRIBED, WOULD HAVE BEEN A SERIOUS THREAT IN TIMES OF SUBVERSION. HE SAID THE ARGENTINE PEOPLE HAVE SHOWN A UNIFIED EFFORT IN THE FACE OF THE ~~EXCESSIVE~~ THE BLOODSHED BROUGHT ABOUT BY TERRORISM BUT ARE GETTING IMPATIENT NOW THAT THE WORST IS OVER. THIS MEANS THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL HAVE TO CHANGE MENTAL ATTITUDES, AND MARTINEZ DE HOZ FEELS THIS CAN BE DONE IF THE GOVERNMENT SPEAKS TRUTHFULLY TO ~~THE~~ THE PEOPLE AND SHOWS IT IS SERIOUS AND RESPONSIBLE.

4. HUMAN RIGHTS - AFTER THIS SOMEWHAT LENGTHY INTRODUCTION THE MINISTER ADDRESSED THE QUESTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. HE EXPLAINED THE THE PERON GOVERNMENT HAD GIVEN AMNESTY TO JAILED SUBVERSIVES WHO HE DESCRIBED AS REAL CRIMINALS AND HOW THESE PEOPLE THREATENED THE JUDGES WHICH, IN TURN, LED TO A BREAKDOWN IN THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND THE FORMATION OF VIGILANTE GROUPS BY CITIZENS SEEKING SELF PROTECTION. THE GOVERNMENT HAS SUPPRESSED

TERRORISM AND BROUGHT ECONOMIC RECOVERY. HE RECOGNIZED THAT FORCE SHOULD NOW BE EXERCISED ONLY THROUGH LEGAL MEANS BUT EXPLAINED THAT THIS WAS DIFFICULT AS REMNANTS OF URBAN TERRORISM STILL EXIST DESPITE GREAT PROGRESS. HE SAID IT IS HARD TO GO FROM A SITUATION OF CHAOS TO ONE IN WHICH THE REINS OF CONTROL, EVEN OVER THE FORCES OF ORDER, ARE BACK TO NORMAL. THE MINISTER ASSURED MRS. DERIAN THAT NO ONE WAS BEING PERSECUTED FOR POLITICAL OR RELIGIOUS BELIEFS (NO ANTI-SEMITISM) ALTHOUGH HE ACKNOWLEDGED THE EXISTANCE OF A SMALL GROUP OF ULTRA NATIONALISTS NOT REPRESENTATIVE OF PUBLIC OPINION. HE SAID THAT JACOBO TIMERMAN WAS IN JAIL NOT BECAUSE HE IS A JEW BUT BECAUSE GRAIVER OWNED 50% OF HIS NEWSPAPER. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT CHARGES HAVE NOT BEEN BROUGHT AND SAID HE HAS URGED THE PRESIDENT TO RESOLVE THIS CASE ONE WAY OR THE OTHER. THE MINISTER CITED THE FOLLOWING SIGNS OF IMPROVEMENT: (1) THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE SUBJECT TO COURT PROCEDURES IS OVER 1000, (2) JUDGES NOW FEEL SAFE, AND (3) TERRORISTS ARE BEGINNING TO DESERT TO THE GOVERNMENT. IN SUM HE SAW A RETURN TO DUE PROCESS AND A RETURN TO TRADITIONAL ARGENTINE VALUES BUT THAT SOME IRREGULAR PROCEDURES AND ANTI-TERRORIST ACTION OUTSIDE THE GOVERNMENT WOULD CONTINUE, ON AN EVER LESSENING SCALE, IN THIS "MOP-UP" STAGE. HE BELIEVED THE SECURITY FORCES WERE COMING UNDER STRICTER GOVERNMENT CONTROL.

5. DERIAN RESPONSE - MRS. DERIAN SAID THAT SHE FOUND THE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

OPTIONAL FORM 1050
(Formerly FS-4)
January 1975
Dept of State

MINISTER'S PRESENTATION VERY RATIONAL. SHE AGREED THAT ARGENTINA HAD FACED A VERY SERIOUS THREAT AND ACKNOWLEDGED THE RELUCTANCE OF THE MILITARY TO STEP IN. SHE EXPLAINED THE TIME BETWEEN SUCH A TAKEOVER AND RETURN TO NORMAL PRACTICE WAS LIMITED AND EXPRESSED HER BELIEF THAT IT MAY NOW BE UPON THE GOVERNMENT OF ARGENTINA. SHE STRESSED THAT THE STABILITY NEEDED TO CARRY OUT SUCH GOOD WORK AS THAT ENVISIONED BY THE MINISTER'S ECONOMIC PLAN COULD BE ACHIEVED ONLY BY SATISFYING THE IMPATIENCE OF THE PEOPLE AND REINSTITUTING DUE PROCESS. SHE EXPLAINED THAT WHAT WAS HAPPENING IN ARGENTINA (I.E. THE CONTINUED ENTRY INTO HOMES BY ARMED MEN, THE TORTURE OF DETAINEES, ETC.) WOULD BE TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF BY POLITICIANS. SHE FELT THE BIGGEST PART OF THE PROBLEM NOW LAY IN GETTING CONTROL OVER THE SECURITY APPARATUS; THAT TIME WAS RUNNING OUT INTERNATIONALLY, AS WELL AS INTERNALLY. SHE CAUTIONED AGAINST THE INSTINCTIVE REACTION OF FIGHTING TERRORISTS WITH THEIR OWN METHODS, SAYING THIS ONLY HELPED THEM ACHIEVE THEIR GOAL OF UNDERMINING THE LEGAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRY. SHE URGED THE GOVERNMENT TO SHOW ITS STRENGTH BY INSTITUTING DUE PROCESS AND APPEALING TO THE PEOPLE FOR SUPPORT. SHE SAID THAT JOURNALISTS SHOULDN'T BE ARRESTED AND WARNED THAT NOTHING IS EVER A SECRET. SHE WARNED AGAINST THE USE OF A PUBLIC RELATIONS APPROACH, WHICH NO ONE BELIEVES, AND STRESSED THE NEED FOR REAL CHANGES SAYING IT WAS LUDICROUS THAT NOW THAT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

OPTIONAL FORM 100A
(Formerly FS-41)
January 1976
Dept. of State

THE GOVERNMENT WAS PROGRESSING THAT INTERNATIONAL OPINION WAS
DETERIORATING.

6. THE MINISTER AGREED BUT EXPLAINED THAT THE PREVIOUS
GOVERNMENT LET THINGS GO TO FAR, THAT HIS GOVERNMENT ~~COULD NOT~~
HANDLE THE SITUATION IT INHERITED BY NORMAL MEANS, AND THAT THE
GOVERNMENT DOES WISH TO RETURN TO THE NORM AND IS STRONG
ENOUGH TO DO SO. HE SAID THAT VIDELA IS A HUMANE, MODEST AND
WELL BALANCED MAN AND IS A VERY GOOD PRESIDENT.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classification

OPTIONAL FORM 153A
(Formerly FS-41-52)
January 1975
Dept. of State

NRCL: 6137

TELEGRAM

1630

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

FROM
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

CLASSIFICATION
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

E.O. 11652:

TAGS:

SUBJECT:

~~XXXXXX~~

ACTION:

INFO:

GDS
SHUM, AR
Interior Minister Sees Jacobo Timerman;
Congressman Gilman Also to be ~~Remix~~
Permitted Interview With Timerman

SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY

USIA WASHDC PRIORITY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUENOS AIRES 6137

CHARGE
POLB
POL/R
USIS
ECOM
LEGATT
DAO
RF
CHRON

from Hector Timerman
1. Embassy has learned that less than two hours
after US Human Rights Coordinator Patricia
Derian discussed on August 10 the mistreatment
of Argentine editor Jacobo Timerman with
Minister of Interior General Albano Eduardo
Harguindeguy, according to Hector,
Harguindeguy ordered that
Timerman be cleaned up, shaved and dressed
and brought to his office free of handcuffs.
Timerman was brought to the Ministry in an
official car.
2. The meeting lasted almost an hour.
Harguindeguy first asked Timerman if he was
related to Patricia Derian, to which Timerman

DRAFTED BY:

POL:WHHallman/USIS:OBRIEN

DRAFTING DATE

8/19/77

TEL. EXT.

278

109-2-1759
CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:

CHARGE:MChaplin

CLLARANCES:

POL/R:Mr. Smock

DATT:COLCoughlin

USIS:Mr. Higgins

FILED

AUG 22 1977

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATION

FBI BUENOS AIRES

OPTIONAL FORM 103
(Formerly FS-413)
January 1973
Dept. of State

answered that they were friends. The Minister then asked Timerman how he had been treated during his imprisonment, creating the impression he had been unaware Timerman had been tortured until Derian told him.

3. Timerman at first refused to answer, citing his fear of "reprisals," but when Harguindeguy assured him there would be none Timerman spelled out in detail the mistreatment he had received in prison after his arrest. He added that his jailers constantly taunted him because he is a Jew.

4. According to Timerman's son, who saw his father the following day, Harguindeguy gave his father the impression--without actually saying this--that he would not be brought before a military tribunal and might soon be freed. He said "We will resolve this situation." This thickens the Timerman plot considerably, since an Embassy officer had been told on the same day "on good authority, from Naval intelligence sources" that Timerman had "confessed to being a communist and a Soviet spy, and that he would be tried on these charges by a military tribunal." When, however, August 18 Members of Congress Gilman and Lagomarsino requested to know what charges had been made against Timerman a reply was received late in the evening from the

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Classification

OPTIONAL FORM 10
(Formerly FS-41)
January 1964
Dept. of State

Ministry of Foreign Affairs that he is being held for "crimes of economic subversion." (Comment: All this probably demonstrates that the forces holding Timerman have not in fact decided just what to do about their increasingly well known prisoner.)

5. Congressman Benjamin Gilman privately asked Ministry of Foreign Affairs for an interview with Timerman, which has tentatively been set for early evening August 19. After interview we may have a better idea of state of play and what will happen next.

6. As for Timerman's family, members were taken aback at Minister Harguindeguy's new stance. What they fear is that he may not be able to prevent reprisals against Jacobo. They have strongly endorsed Gilman's visit with him.

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Classification

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TELEGRAM

1977 AUG 22 PM 12 41

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22 AUG 1977
1241

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

FROM
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

CLASSIFICATION
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

E.O. 11652:
TAGS:
SUBJECT:

GDS
SHUM, AR
Interior Minister Sees Jacobo Timerman;
Congressman Gilman Also to be
Permitted Interview with Timerman

~~REURON~~

ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO: USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUENOS AIRES 6173

REF: BUENOS AIRES 6137
CHANGE CLASSIFICATION CONTROL ON

CHARGE
POL3
POL/R
USIS
ECOM
LEGATT
DAO
RF
CHRON

BUENOS AIRES 6137 TO XGDS-4.

Information contained reftel must be protected.

Its disclosure would place subject individual
in immediate jeopardy of his life and could also
have a deleterious effect on US-Argentine
relations.

me
CHAPLIN

DRAFTED BY:
LABATT:AGFreeman:gcr

DRAFTING DATE
8/22/77

TEL. EXT.
277

CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:
POL:WHHafman

CLEARANCES:

109.2-1759A

AUG 22 1977

Attach to outgoing reftel
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONTROL: 6353

26-AUG-77

1300

DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

FROM
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

CLASSIFICATION
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

O. 11652:
TAGS:
SUBJECT:

GDS
SHUM, AR
TIMERMAN MOVED

ACTION:
INFO:

SECSTATE WASHDC
USIA WASHDC
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUENOS AIRES 6353

REF: BUENOS AIRES 6137

1. According to Jacobo Timerman's son Hector,

Timerman and approximately 30 other ~~indivi~~

individuals implicated in the Graiver case

were in past several days transported together

to the military garrison in Magdalena, a

Province
town in Buenos Aires /some 60 miles South
of the Capital.

2. Hector has been told that military
defendants.
attorneys have been named for all ~~defendants~~

Further legal proceedings will take place

in Magdalena "for security reasons", he

believes. According to Hector's sources

a military tribunal will now study each

case individually to decide if ~~defendants~~

defendants should be brought before a

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DRAFTED BY:

POL:WHHallman/USIS/BRIEN 8/26/77

DRAFTING DATE

TEL. EXT.

278

CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:

POL:WHHallman

CLEARANCES:

AUG 25 1977

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATION

OPTIONAL FORM 153
(Formerly FS-413)
January 1975
Dept. of State

military tribunal, a civilian court, or set free.
these
One estimate is that ~~this~~ proceedings will be
finished by September 30.

CHAPLIN *[Signature]*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE TELEGRAM

CONTROL: 6559
02 SEP 77
-1130

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

FROM
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

CLASSIFICATION
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: SHUM, PFOR, AR
SUBJECT: DERIAN MEETING WITH MINISTER OF INTERIOR HARGUINDEGUY

ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO: AMEMBASSY ASUNCION
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
~~AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO~~

CHARGE
POL-3
POL/R
ECON
USIS
SY
LEGATT
MILGP
DAO
RF
CHRON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUENOS AIRES: 6559

REF: (A) BUENOS AIRES 6221 (NOTAL) (B) STATE 193418 (NOTAL)

SUMMARY: HUMAN RIGHTS COORDINATOR MET WITH MINISTER
OF INTERIOR ON AUGUST 10. THERE SEEMED TO BE SOME
CONFUSION AS TO WHO HAD REQUESTED THE MEETING. THE
MINISTER STRESSED HIS DUTY IN PROTECTING THE MAJORITY
OF THE ARGENTINE PEOPLE IN A TIME OF WAR AGAINST
SUBVERSION, MRS. DERIAN STRESSED THAT THE TIME HAD
NOW ARRIVED FOR A RETURN TO DUE PROCESS.

1. MRS. DERIAN STARTED BY EXPLAINING TO THE MINISTER
THAT SHE WAS VERY CONCERNED WITH THE ENORMOUS NUMBER OF
KK PEOPLE WHO HAD DISAPPEARED, THE NUMBER XXXX IN JAIL

DRAFTED BY: *[Signature]*
D/HA:MBova:eg

DRAFTING DATE TEL. EXT.
277

CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:
POLCOUNS:WHallman *[Signature]*

LEARANCES:

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FILED

SEP 2 1977

FBI-BUENOS AIRES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CLASSIFICATION

OPTIONAL FORM 150 (H)
(Formerly FS 413 (H))
January 1975
Dept. of State

WHO ARE

WITHOUT CHARGES, THE NUMBER ~~WHO ARE~~ IS SIMPLY LOST AND THE NUMBER FOUND INNOCENT WHO REMAIN IN JAIL. SHE SAID IT APPEARS THAT ONCE A PERSON IS PICKED UP IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO GET RELEASED. SHE REFERRED TO THE HARD FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM, STATING THAT SHE THOUGHT THE BACK OF THE TERRORISTS HAD NOW BEEN BROKEN. SHE WORRIED THAT WHEN A WIDE NET IS CAST MANY INNOCENT PEOPLE GET CAUGHT. SHE EXPLAINED THAT THE CHIEF OBSTACLE FOR RETURNING TO NORMAL RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. IS OUR CONCERN FOR THE MASS OF PEOPLE CAUGHT IN THE SYSTEM WITH NOTHING HAPPENING. SHE CITED PARTICULAR CONCERN FOR JACOBO ~~TIMMERMAN~~ AS A PERSON WHO HAS BECOME A SYMBOL OF THIS PROBLEM. SHE NOTED THAT WHEN SHE TALKS WITH HIGH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS THEY SPEAK OF REGULARIZING PROCEDURES, BUT THAT WHEN SHE TALKS TO INDIVIDUALS IT APPEARS THAT THESE PLANS AREN'T BEING CARRIED OUT IN PRACTICE.

2. THE MINISTER RESPONDED THAT HER PREOCCUPATION FOR THE RIGHTS OF THE PERSON ARE NO LESS THAN THE RESPONSIBILITY THE GOA HAS FOR INTERNAL SECURITY. HE SAID THE GOA WAS FIGHTING AN UNDECLARED WAR AND OPERATING UNDER THE EXCEPTIONS GRANTED BY THE CONSTITUTION. HE SAID THIS PERMITTED THE GOVERNMENT TO SHIFT PEOPLE FROM ONE PLACE TO THE OTHER UNLESS THEY EXERCISED THE RIGHT OF OPTION. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THIS RIGHT WAS SUSPENDED BECAUSE THE GOVERNMENT COULDN'T AFFORD TO LET 2,000 PEOPLE OUT TO GATHER AGAINST IT ON THE FRONTIER. MRS. DERIAN ASKED IF ALL THE DETAINED WERE TERRORISTS. THE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

MINISTER NOTED THAT THOSE WHO WERE DETAINED WITHOUT PROCESS WERE TERRORISTS AND THAT THESE ARE FEW. HE SAID MANY ARE GOING THROUGH CIVIL AND MILITARY COURTS.

3. MRS. DERIAN SAID THAT THE INSTINCTIVE REACTION TO TERRORISM IS TO DO WHAT THE GOA HAD DONE AND THAT IT MAKES THE PEOPLE VICTIMS OF THE STATE. SHE REFERRED TO THE MOTHERS AND WIVES WHO JOIN TOGETHER IN THE PLAZA EVERY THURSDAY AND CALL ON DIFFERENT OFFICES, INCLUDING THAT IN THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR, SEEKING INFORMATION ON THEIR FAMILY MEMBERS. SHE ALSO REFERRED TO LABOR LEADERS IN JAIL SINCE 1975. ??? 1976

4. THE MINISTER SAID THAT HE TOO HAD TALKED TO WOMEN WHOSE FAMILY MEMBERS DISAPPEARED AND THAT THERE WAS AN OFFICE IN HIS MINISTRY TO DEAL WITH THEIR INQUIRIES. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT IF THESE WOMEN JOINED TOGETHER IN CONCERTED ACTION AND, IN EFFECT, ARE DEMONSTRATING WITHOUT A PERMIT, THAT THIS WOULD BE AGAINST THE LAW. HE ASKED MRS. DERIAN TO CONSIDER THE CAUSES FOR DISAPPEARANCES.

5. SHE SAID SHE HAD HEARD THEM MANY TIMES AND HAD SEEN A BIG BOOK, THAT SHE UNDERSTOOD THE GOA'S PROBLEM WITH TERRORISM BUT DID NOT UNDERSTAND A GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD NOT FURNISH THE NAMES OF THE TERRORISTS.

6. THE MINISTER REFERRED TO THE FACT THAT THOSE DETAINED WERE IN NORMAL JAILS AND THAT ARGENTINE JAILS WERE OPEN TO THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS (ICRC). HE HANDED HER COPIES IN

SPANISH OF ICRC REPORTS. MRS. DERIAN SPECULATED THAT PRISONERS MIGHT BE HELD IN OTHER PLACES WHICH THE RED CROSS HAS NOT SEEN. THE MINISTER SAID THEY LET THE RED CROSS GO WHEREVER IT WANTS, INCLUDING TO MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. HE SAID THERE WERE NO CONCENTRATION CAMPS. ASKED ABOUT THE NAVY MECHANICAL SCHOOL, HE SAID PEOPLE MIGHT BE HELD FOR INTERROGATION IN SUCH PLACE BUT WOULD NOT BE JAILED THERE. HE SAID SUBVERSIVES ARE JAILED IN THE MAXIMUM SECURITY PRISONS.

7. MRS. DERIAN ASKED THE MINISTER WHAT WERE THE NORMS FOR INTERROGATION. THE MINISTER RESPONDED THAT WHEN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM STARTED, THOSE CAUGHT WERE TOUGH AND HIGHLY DISCIPLINED AND HAD A HIGH MORALE. HE SAID THEY WOULDN'T CONFESS ANYTHING; BUT NOW THE FIRST THING THAT PEOPLE CAUGHT DO IS TO GIVE THE NAMES OF THEIR ACCOMPLICES. HE SAID THE SUBVERSIVES ARE NOW COOPERATING AND THE GOVERNMENT SHOWS CLEMENCY TO THOSE WHO TURN THEMSELVES IN AND IS STARTING TWO PENAL COLONIES TO REINTEGRATE THOSE WHO COOPERATE INTO SOCIETY. ONCE THE MINISTER SAID THAT ~~ONE~~ IT IS DETERMINED THAT A PERSON HAS PROVIDED THE NEEDED INFORMATION HE PASSES INTO ONE OF THREE SITUATIONS. THE GREAT BULK, WHERE THE EVIDENCE AGAINST THEM IS SUFFICIENT, GO TO THE CIVIL OR MILITARY TRIBUNALS. THE OTHERS, WHO HAVE CONFESSED BUT WHERE EVIDENCE IS LACKING, OR WHO DON'T CONFESS BUT WHO ARE ACCUSED BY OTHERS BUT TANGIBLE EVIDENCE IS LACKING, ARE HELD UNDER ARTICLE 23 BY THE EXECUTIVE POWER. THESE ARE THE PEOPLE WHO COULD EXERCISE THE RIGHT OF

OPTION AND, AT THIS TIME, THERE EXIST THE JUDICIAL INSTRUMENTS NECESSARY TO REINSTITUTE THE RIGHT OF OPTION.

8. MRS. DERIAN OBSERVED THAT IT APPEARED AS IF THE GOVERNMENT USED THE CONSTITUTION WHEN IT WAS TO ITS BENEFIT AND SUSPENDED IT OTHERWISE.. THE MINISTER OBSERVED THAT IN A STATE OF WAR ONE COULDN'T LET THE ENEMY GO. MRS. DERIAN OBSERVED THAT IN THE IDEOLOGICAL KIND OF WAR WHICH ARGENTINA FACED, THE GOVERNMENTS STRENGTH AND PUBLIC SUPPORT LAG IN ITS RESPECT FOR THE RULE OF LAW. SHE SAID THAT THERE WAS A LIMITED TIME WHERE PEOPLE WOULD PUT UP WITH ALMOST ANYTHING TO RETURN TO DEMOCRATIC NORMS BUT THAT TIME WAS VERY LIMITED. SHE COUNSELED THAT IT WAS NOW TIME FOR THE GOA TO SHOW ITS STRENGTH BY RETURNING TO LEGAL NORMS AND PUBLISHING THE NAMES OF THOSE DETAINED.

9. THE MINISTER OBSERVED THAT MANY OF THOSE WHO HAVE DISAPPEARED WERE NOT HELD BY THE GOVERNMENT. HE ~~KKK~~ POINTED TO THE CRIME FREE ATMOSPHERE OF ARGENTINA AND STRESSED IT WAS THE GOVERNMENT'S DUTY TO PROTECT THE MANY FROM THE FEW. MRS. DERIAN ASKED HIM ABOUT PEOPLE BEING ARRESTED FOR NOT HAVING AN IDENTITY CARD AND WONDERED ~~XX~~ IF THE SITUATION IN ARGENTINA WAS LIKE THAT IN SOUTH AFRICA WHERE ALL WERE EXPECTED TO CARRY IDENTITY CARDS. THE MINISTER SAID THIS WAS THE SYSTEM.

10. RETURNING TO THE ~~TIMMERMAN~~ CASE, WHICH MRS. DERIAN HAD ~~XXX~~ MENTIONED EARLIER, THE MINISTER SAID THAT ~~TIMMERMAN~~ WAS AN OLD FRIEND, BUT THAT HE HAD HEARD TAPES AND SEEN A WRITTEN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

CONFESSION. ~~THE~~ MRS. DERIAN TOLD HIM THAT WE DID NOT HAVE CONFIDENCE IN ANY CONFESSION OBTAINED AS A RESULT OF TORTURE.

11. THE MINISTER SAID ~~TIMMERMAN~~ HAD BEEN IN HIS OFFICE AND LIED TO HIM ABOUT GRAVIER'S INTEREST IN HIS NEWS-PAPER. HE SAID HIS CASE WAS BEING PROCESSED AND INVITED MRS. DERIAN OR THE CHARGE TO VISIT ~~TIMMERMAN~~. MRS. DERIAN RESPONDED THAT SHE WOULD LIKE THE MINISTER TO SEE HIM, THAT SHE HAD SEEN HIM ON A PREVIOUS VISIT BECAUSE HE REPRESENTED A DIFFERENT AND RESPECTED POINT OF VIEW, THAT HE HAD DEFENDED THE GOVERNMENT AT THAT TIME AND THAT ~~XXXX~~ HIS EDITORIALS MANIFESTED THAT SUPPORT. THE MINISTER AGREED. MRS. DERIAN ADDED THAT NOT TEN DAYS AFTER SHE SAW ~~TIMMERMAN~~ HE WAS ARRESTED, THAT CHARGES HAVE NOT YET BEEN BROUGHT AGAINST HIM AND THAT HE HAS BEEN MOVED FROM JAIL TO JAIL AND HIS HEALTH HAS SUFFERED GREATLY.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

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NNNNVV ESA840BRA470
RR RUESBA
DE RUEHC #5559/1 3441411
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 101019Z DEC 77
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 9190
BT

~~SECRET~~

STATE 295559.

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: AR

SUBJECT: US GOALS AND OBJECTIVES IN ARGENTINA
AMBASSADOR'S GOALS AND OBJECTIVES --ARGENTINA

10 14 48.

TO	ACT	INF	TO	ACT	INF
AMB			DAO		
DCM			L. GALT		
			DEA		
FOL	3		FAS		
ECOM			AID		
FOL/R			MILGP		
UD 3			PEI		
ADM			GSO		
USIS			B & F		
SCI			CHRON		
SY			HF		

I. ENHANCED OBSERVATION OF POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS

-- REITERATE TO ALL LEVELS OF THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH THE US VIEWS CONTINUING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: AND THAT IF CONSIDERABLE AND VISIBLE IMPROVEMENT DOES NOT OCCUR, THE US MAY HAVE TO LIMIT FURTHER ITS ECONOMIC AND MILITARY TIES TO ARGENTINA.

-- URGE THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT TO RESTORE BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS, WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON THE RESTORATION OF DUE PROCESS, THE CURBING OF OFFICIALLY COMMITTED OR SANCTIONED ABUSES, AND THE PUBLICATION OF LISTS OF DETAINEES.

-- PERSUADE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT LEADERS THAT THEIR INTERNATIONAL IMAGE CAN BE IMPROVED BY SIGNING AND RATIFYING THE AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS TO ASSESS THE ACCURACY OF ALLEGATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS

VIOLATIONS.

-- GIVE SPECIAL EMPHASIS TO CULTURAL EXCHANGES OF JURISTS AND OTHER INDIVIDUALS WHO MIGHT INFLUENCE HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES.

-- ENCOURAGE STEADY PROGRESS T WARD DEMOCRATIC, CIVILIAN, AND CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING THE LIFTING OF RESTRICTIONS ON POLITICAL PARTIES, LABOR UNIONS AND OTHER DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS.

-- DEVELOP CONTACTS AND WORKING RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE ENTIRE SPECTRUM OF LEGITIMATE POLITICAL PARTIES.

-- ENCOURAGE ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESSIONAL VISITS TO ARGENTINA WHICH WILL STRESS US CONCERN FOR BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS.

-- ENCOURAGE A GREATER AWARENESS OF THE PROBLEMS OF THE POOR AND THE UNEMPLOYED OF THE COUNTRY AND A GREATER WILLINGNESS TO DEAL WITH THESE PROBLEMS.

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FBI-BUENOS AIRES 4-12-76

02 -- CONTRIBUTE TO THE INTERNATIONAL EFFORT TO SETTLE ARGENTINES WHO MAY BE TARGETS FOR POLITICAL PERSECUTION, IN THE US AN ELSEWHERE.

II. ARGENTINE SUPPORT FOR OUR NPT, ARMS CONTROL POLICIES

-- PERSUADE THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT TO RATIFY AND SUPPORT THE TREATY OF TLAELOLCO AND FOREGO THE ACQUISITION OF AN INDEPENDENT REPROCESSING CAPABILITY.

-- ENCOURAGE ACTIVE ARGENTINE INVOLVEMENT IN THE INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE EVALUATION PROGRAM AND N SUBSEQUENT STUDIES DEVOTED TO DEVELOPING NUCLEAR ENERGY AND ENSURING THAT IT IS USED FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES.

III. ARGENTINE ROLE ON ECONOMIC ISSUES

-- ENCOURAGE ARGENTINA TO PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN DEFINING AND NEGOTIATING ECONOMIC ISSUES IN THE ONGOING DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE INDUSTRIALIZED AND DEVELOPING WORLD BASED ON ITS OWN INTERESTS RATHER THAN THE CONCEPT OF

LATIN AMERICAN, THIRD WORLD OR G-77 SOLIDARITY.

-- WORK TO MAINTAIN THE 20 US SHARE OF THE ARGENTINE MARKET BY TRADE SHOWS, EXHIBITIONS, ETC.

-- DO NOT DISCOURAGE ARGENTINA FROM DIVERSIFYING ITS ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH EXTRA-HEMISPHERIC COUNTRIES.

-- ENCOURAGE ARGENTINA TO INCREASE ITS ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRIES.

-- ENCOURAGE THE PRODUCTIVE DEVELOPMENT OF ARGENTINA'S AGRICULTURE AND MANUFACTURING SECTORS.

-- ENCOURAGE ARGENTINA TO PLAY A ROLE AS INTERMEDIARY IN THE TRANSMISSION OF TECHNOLOGY BETWEEN INDUSTRIALIZED AND POOR COUNTRIES.

IV. A SATISFACTORY BILATERAL SECURITY RELATIONSHIP WHICH PROMOTES US SECURITY INTERESTS

-- DISCOURAGE ARGENTINA'S PARTICIPATION IN A "SOUTHERN CONE" BLOC DEVOTED TO UNDERMINING A MULTILATERAL AND POSITIVE POLICY ON HUMAN RIGHTS.

-- PROMOTE US SECURITY INTERESTS AND MAINTAIN MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN THE BOUNDS AND SPIRIT OF US LAW

~~SECRET~~

13. AND CONSISTENT WITH ADMINISTRATION POLICY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS RESTRAINT AND HUMAN RIGHTS. ENCOURAGE CONTINUED PARTICIPATION IN COLLECTIVE HEMISPHERIC SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS (RIO TREATY).

-- WORK TO LIMIT SOVIET INROADS INTO ARGENTINA, KEEPING IN MIND THAT ARGENTINA'S FAVORABLE TRADE BALANCE WITH THE USSR MAY FACILITATE SUCH RELATIONS.

-- IF THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION PERMITS, PRESS THE ARGENTINES TO REJOIN THE 1978 JOINT LATIN AMERICAN-US FLEET EXERCISE (UNITAS).

V. ENCOURAGEMENT OF SCIENTIFIC AND MULTILATERAL COOPERATION, ESPECIALLY OVER INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ISSUES

-- MAINTAIN US-ARGENTINE SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION, PARTICULARLY IN ANTARCTICA, WHERE ONE OF OUR STATIONS IS SUPPLIED VIA ARGENTINA.

-- ENCOURAGE ARGENTINA TO PLAY A HELPFUL ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ISSUES SUPPORTIVE OF US POSITIONS.

-- IF APPROPRIATE, ENCOURAGE ARGENTINE INVOLVEMENT IN IMPORTANT INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ISSUES, E.G., THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTHERN AFRICA.

VII. PROMOTION OF IMPROVED HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES THROUGH CULTURAL EXCHANGES

-- GIVE SPECIAL EMPHASIS TO EXCHANGES OF JURISTS AND OTHER INDIVIDUALS WHO MIGHT INFLUENCE HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES. CHRISTOPHER

BT

#5559

~~SECRET~~

CONTROL: 0458
192011Z JAN 78

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
TELEGRAM

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

FROM

Amembassy BUENOS AIRES

CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652:

N/A

TAGS:

OREP, SHUM, AR

SUBJECT:

CODEL REUSS -- Meeting with U.S. Business Community in Buenos Aires

ACTION:

SECSTATE WASHDC

UNCLASSIFIED BUENOS AIRES 0458

ARA/PPC - Peter Johnson

REF: RIO DE JANEIRO 0093

AMB
DCM
ECOM-4
CHRON
RF
POL
POL/R
DAO
USIS
LEGATT
SY

At the request of Representative Henry Hyde, source cited reftel prepared following summary of subject meeting with the understanding that it will not be attributed to any person or organization:

QUOTE:

SUMMARY OF MEETINGS BETWEEN U.S. CONGRESSMEN AND LEADING MEMBERS OF THE U.S. COMMUNITY IN BUENOS AIRES, Argentina, on January 5, 1978

As senior member of the Congressional delegation, Rep. Moorhead expressed the group's interest in hearing as many points of view as possible, and its pleasure at having the opportunity to meet with leading members of the North American Community in Buenos Aires.

DRAFTED BY:

ECOM:RReed/mp *RR*

DRAFTING DATE

1/19/78

TEL. EXT.

350

CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:

ECOM:JCAmott

CLEARANCES:

DCM: *INDEXED*
FILED

JAN 20 1978

UNCLASSIFIED

CLASSIFICATION

Most of the discussion which followed was in answer to questions by the Congressmen and concerned terrorism and human rights problems, with the following major points made:

Anti-semitism does exist in Argentina, as in any country with a sizable Jewish population (the local Jewish community generally is described as the world's fourth largest), but anti-semitism is not official policy and allegations that Jews are being singled out for mistreatment by the armed forces and police because of their religious beliefs are exaggerated. There is considerable suspicion of the Jewish Community among other Argentines because of the disproportionate number of Jews among leftist extremists. This, however, was attributed to the fact that extremists of the left have concentrated their recruiting efforts in the universities, where the percentage of Jews enrolled is much higher than the percentage of Jews in the population at large.

It was recognized that the resentment described above is an element in the case of Jacobo Timerman, founder and publisher of the newspaper LA OPINION of Buenos Aires. But those commenting said that MR. Timerman's arrest and continued detention were primarily the result of his close ties with Peronists blamed for wrecking the economy between 1973 and 1976.

There is widespread skepticism about allegations of massive human rights violations in Argentina, especially those voiced by liberal politicians and so-called human rights "activists" in the United States who have been notably silent about atrocities committed by extremists of the left.

One participant recalled that when two Americans, Ford Motor Co. manager John Swint and U.S. Consular Agent John Patrick Egan, were murdered by leftist extremists, so-called human rights elements in the United States -- including those in the U.S. Congress -- were not heard to denounce the killings. This and similar instances, he said, have convinced many people in Argentina that "human rights" groups are motivated or at least swayed by political beliefs rather than by sincere concern over human rights. That belief, he said, was re-inforced by U.S. co-sponsorship of a United Nations resolution condemning Chile while ignoring the fact that many countries -- including co-sponsor Cuba -- have far bloodier human rights records than Chile.

Another person compared the local situation to destruction of the Symbionese Liberation Army (in Los Angeles), whose demise most Americans seemed to regard as fully justified in view of the ferocity and desperation of the SLA. Argentine extremists, he explained, have been

and remain every bit as vicious and desperate as the SLA was, and most Argentines look upon their disappearance the same way that Americans saw the SLA episode.

One executive reviewed a five-year period during which he, his family, his home, his automobile and his factory were the targets of bombs, bullets and constant threats. Despite the fact that he was heavily guarded, he never knew when he left home in the morning whether he would return that evening, or whether his family would be alive if he did so. "What about my human rights?" he asked. "Where were the people who should have been concerned about my human rights? I would like to know."

A U.S. resident cited two cases which he said help put the situation into better focus -- explaining attitudes, not justifying them. The first was that of an Army colonel kidnapped and held for months in a hole beneath the floor of a shack on the edge of Buenos Aires. His captors, he said after his escape, told him that they were prepared to wipe out 20 million people -- women and children included -- should that prove necessary to take over Argentina. (It was noted that Argentina has about 25 million people.) The second one was an attack on an off-duty Army captain and his children in which the officer and one daughter were murdered and a second child

wounded so seriously that she will be a "vegetable" as long as she lives. The North American's comment was that the officers and men who served with the colonel and the captain are not at all inclined to "go easy" on extremists who fall into their hands, regardless of instructions from above and/or protests from abroad.

Several persons complained of a general lack of understanding in the United States about what Argentina has been through, both politically and economically, and of the desire on the part of those who have suffered to see those responsible for the suffering punished -- without being afforded the benefits of the U.S. legal system. One man emphasized the fact that the laws of Argentina and other Latin nations are based on the "guilty until proven innocent" Napoleonic Code, rather than English Common Law with its emphasis on individual rights. Another cited the widely held belief that extremists have so intimidated judges -- murdering one -- that no civilian jurist would dare give a stiff sentence to convicted terrorist. Still another recalled the period during which enrollment in a school attended largely by the children of U.S. residents ~~plung~~ plunged from 1300 to less than 300 in two years. Families had to flee without telling their friends, carrying only hand luggage. People who experienced that, he said,


may find it hard to keep in mind that two wrongs do not make a right, or to work up sympathy for leftists whose rights are being violated now.

Quiet diplomacy appears much more effective in bringing about improvements than well-publicized and orchestrated criticism from Washington and the United Nations, especially since such attacks seem to be leveled almost exclusively against anti-Communist governments while excesses in Cuba, Cambodia and any number of African and Middle East nations go unnoticed or unde-nounced. An example of counter-productive action cited was the Congressional move to include human rights in the criteria for loans from international agencies.

There also was discussion of the Argentine Government's anti-inflation program and its attitude toward U.S. investment. Most participants expressed optimism and, in particular, admiration for Economy Minister José A. Martínez de Hoz and his associates in their efforts to ~~be~~ rebuild the economy.

END QUOTE.

CASTRO



TELEGRAM

GRAM: 0482
20131559Z JAN 78
INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

FROM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

E.O. 11652:
TAGS:
SUBJECT: Disappearance of French Nuns and
Mothers' Group Supporters

ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO: AMEMBASSY ASUNCION
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO

AMB
DCM
POL3
POLR
ECOM
USIS
SY
LEGATT
CONS
REF
CHRON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BUENOS AIRES 77 0482

REF: A) 77 BUENOS AIRES 9420 (NOTAL);
B) 77 BUENOS AIRES 9715; C) BUENOS AIRES 9763;
D) 77 BUENOS AIRES 9523 (NOTAL)

SUMMARY: We have tried hard to clarify the
circumstances surrounding the disappearance
of two French nuns and some 11 other Argentine
citizens in a series of abductions December 8-10.
Our findings are contradictory and inconclusive,
and the fact remains that at this writing we
have no sure knowledge regarding the nuns'
abductors or their present whereabouts. Our
sources generally agree that the operation was
carried out by some arm of the security forces.

DRAFTED BY: POL:WHHallman
POL:VThayer:gcr
DRAFTING DATE 1/19/78
TEL. EXT. 277
CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY: DCM:MChaplin

CLEARANCES:

~~POLXXXXXXXXXX~~

~~SI:RK-11~~

POLR:DSmock

LEGATT:RScherrer

CONS:Shapiro (in draft)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATION

BA-17
1-12-76
OPTIONAL FORM 153
(Formerly FS-412)
January 1975
Dept of State

but which specific group and the level of responsibility is unclear. The supposed Montonero note claiming responsibility for the abduction has been generally discounted and the government's failure to follow up or publicly play that lead indicates that not even GOA is seriously convinced of Montonero involvement.

END SUMMARY

1. The Embassy has made considerable effort to clarify the circumstances surrounding the disappearance of two French nuns and several other Argentine citizens in a series of related abductions during December. The single aspect of the case on which there is general agreement is that the operations were probably carried out by security forces and that those persons responsible and knowledgeable about the case are guarding their information very closely.

2. The question of which group and even of which branch of the security forces--and at what level--might be responsible for the abductions remains unclear. All three military services and the police deny--apparently even to their bosses the top service commanders--having any responsibility or information on the case. Absence of knowledge is the official stance of the Argentine Government. Reportedly, government leadership--at very least President Videla--is seriously concerned about

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the international implications of the nuns' disappearance, and word has gone out from top levels in the Federal Police and the Army to locate the nuns and "cough them up" if found. The apparent lack of any publishable response is taken by some sources as evidence that the abducted persons are not being held by the Federal Police and probably not the Army--it being assumed that Videla has clout with these groups sufficient to force one or another to reveal its hand. Expression to this belief clearly implies that it was the Navy which pulled off the abductions, but this is left unsaid except during most confidential and intimate conversations.

3. Most sources strongly deny that the Federal police were in any way involved. ~~At the same time,~~ nevertheless Relatives of the disappeared persons claim that the kidnappers showed police credentials and that one of the detainees managed to send a message to his family through a prisoner subsequently released that he was being held in Federal Police Headquarters (See BUENOS AIRES 9715). It is also apparent that the kidnappers were free to operate in considerable number in a downtown church square without any interference from regular police in the area. ~~This implies that at least there was recognition of mistaken belief--on the part of police forces that a legitimate security operation was in~~

progress and the police should stand clear. (Several of those disappeared had been previously picked up by police in earlier arrests made at the Plaza de Mayo demonstrations, but the arrests were made openly and the persons subsequently released after questioning at the police headquarters.) XXXX

4. There is considerable dispute and a spectrum of theory whether the abductors were some low-level group acting on its own or whether the operation was authorized by or subsequently brought to the attention of those at a higher level. The French Embassy's military attache has stated confidentially that he does not believe that the top levels of the three services can possibly be implicated in the case. Yet some sources claim it is impossible for the Army or any element of the Army to have committed the operation without the Commander in Chief, President Videla, knowing of it within a day. Those who defend the Army hint that the Navy may have abducted the nuns in order to embarrass the Videla Government and undermine his "Peace by Christmas" initiative (if, in fact, there ever was one). High-level Navy sources declare that the top Navy hierarchy is in firm control and that it is impossible for anyone in the Navy to act completely on his own authority. This discounts the possibility that some "out of control"

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navy group authored the abductions. Admiral Massera himself obliquely blamed the Army as the service most capable of such a muddled, ill-judged caper as this one. (See BUENOS AIRES 9523). The Air Force is generally discounted as not having the capability or motive to have authored the operation.

5. One theory is that security forces--affiliation unknown--were simply going about their business of rounding up suspected subversives and/or troublemakers without special consideration to the international political sensitivity of the nuns and the mothers' group supporters. (Comment: Several Argentine sources have referred to the nuns' order as being leftist or even "communist.") Once these forces discovered they had two hot potatoes on their hands--the nuns and a barrage of adverse publicity and pressure from abroad--the Army (possibly at the level of the First Corps Commander) conceived the abortive "Montonero letter ploy" (See BUENOS AIRES 9763). An extension of this theory has it that the presidency did become aware of the facts, at some point, but found the information so monstrous and embarrassing that it believed it had no choice but to stonewall all the way. (This theory of course has grim implications for the abducted persons, since the easiest course might be to liquidate the abducted group and

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hide the evidence.)

6. A variant of the above theory was information which came from a well-known American businessman who employs Army intelligence officers as moonlighting night time security watchmen. These guards claimed to have positive knowledge that a group of security officers picked up the nuns not only because they believed the nuns to be leftists but also to signal their dissatisfaction with Videla's "soft policy" on subversion. In this variant, it was also believed that the President knows of the deed but lacks the power or the determination to move against those guilty.

7. In this plethora of possibilities and theories, the one that seems the least plausible is that which suggests Montonero involvement. In their deteriorated state at present, it is unlikely the Montoneros still possess the logistical capability to have abducted and be holding the nuns and some 11 other Argentines. The fact that government officials themselves have failed to follow up or to publicly play that lead ~~indicates~~ ~~indicates~~ not only that they don't believe it but that they don't think it will "fly". (Although, as time passes and the government's silence becomes untenable, some military officers have shown an inclination to refloat the Montonero argument--when they are not hinting at the

involvement of some rival military service.)

8. The one argument not touched thus far is that of "cui bono." In the muddled situation we face here perceptions of "benefit" to one party or another may seem bizarre. There could even be reason to suspect Montonero involvement on this basis, for if in fact ^{one} the aim of that movement is to discredit the Argentine Government before the world then the nuns' abductions and those of their associates performs this admirably. If we can propose that Admiral Massera's political ambitions and dislike for Videla outstrip his sense of loyalty to the Junta of which he is member and Argentina's international image, then the abductions are well made for the Admiral's benefit. In these same "cui bono" arguments we cannot even dismiss the shortsighted (in our opinion) view of a security service, which sees its mission the extirpation of subversion in all its forms. To persons of this mind the government's own discomfiture is not so important as there being one less "subversive" nucleus. About the only persons who in no way can benefit from the abductions appear to be Videla himself and those Army generals--Viola and Harguindeguy, for example--high in government and closely associated with Videla's competence and fate.

9. We learned from deputy Nuncio Kevin Mullen

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4-12-76

(protect) that the Papal Nuncio received a reply to his official inquiry from Interior Minister Harguindeguy early this week to the effect that despite an "exhaustive search" GOA has no information on what happened to the nuns. Mullen said that by the tone of the letters he believes Minister of Interior Harguindeguy is suggesting that the case should be considered closed. According to today's press (January 20), Argentine Ambassador Anchorena recently told the French Foreign Ministry that Videla's answer to Giscard d'Estaing's personal letter on the nuns would be soon forthcoming. The Argentine demarche also indicated that Harguindeguy had sent a letter to French National Assembly President Faure explaining measures taken to clear up the affair. We suppose that Harguindeguy's response ^{was} to Faure in the vein of his letter to the Nuncio.

10. The French and Vatican embassies appear to have lapsed into resignation and doubt that any further action would have any positive effect. Officials from both embassies have speculated privately to Embassy officers that they fear the nuns are dead. There is also no indication that the French are inclined to take any dramatic action which might prejudice other bilateral interests, including important commercial ties. At this point there seems to be little more that diplomatic protest can produce, except possibly even greater frustration for the

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
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4-12-76

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(Formerly FS-413A)
January 1975
Dept of State

government in its inability to determine what happened in this case--or more surly reticence if it is deliberately withholding information which would prove too damaging to reveal.


CASTRO

4-12-76
BA-9

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OO RUESBA
DE RUEHC #2648 0280108
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 272253Z JAN 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES IMMEDIATE 9702
BT

~~IMMEDIATE ACTION~~

TO	ACT	INF	TO	ACT	INF
AMB			RAO		
DCM			L GATT		
			DEA		
POL			FAS		
ECOM			AID		
POL/R			MILGP		
CONS			PEH		
ADM			GSO		
USIS			B & F		
SCI			CHRON		
SY			RF		

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E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PINT, SHUM, AR

SUBJECT: MASSERA AND HUMAN RIGHTS

1. ARTICLE WHICH APPEARED IN JANUARY 27 "WASHINGTON POST" HAS BEEN SENT TO YOU BY THE USIA WIRELESS.

2. WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS ON WHETHER MASSERA IS ON THE SIDE OF THE ANGELS, AS HE SEEMS TO BE PORTRAYING HIMSELF.

3. WOULD APPRECIATE REPLY BY COB JANUARY 30. CHRISTOPHER
BT
#2648

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109-2-1780

Per

Scherr

TELEGRAM

INDICATE
☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

FROM	AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES	CLASSIFICATION	CONFIDENTIAL
E.O. 11652:	GDS		
TAGS:	PINT, SHUM, AR		
SUBJECT:	MASSERA AND HUMAN RIGHTS		
ACTION:	SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE		
	CONFIDENTIAL BUENOS AIRES		
AMB	REF: STATE 22648		
DCM	1. It is difficult for us to believe that		
POL3	Massera is on the side of the angels where		
POLR	human rights in Argentina are concerned.		
ECOM	We believe this difficulty is shared by		
USIS	private Argentines who give thought to		
DAO	human rights. It is widely believed here		
LEGATT	that the Navy (as well as the Army, Air Force		
SY	and Federal Police), has been responsible for		
RF	abductions, torture during interrogations,		
CHRON	summary execution, and extra-legal detention.		
	2. There is no firm evidence, however, about		
	any of this. The possibility exists that		
	Massera's boys in blue are truly Argentina's		
	finest, pure of heart and with unstained hands		
	The fact, however, that the Navy has its own		

DRAFTED BY:	DRAFTING DATE	TEL. EXT.	CONTENTS AND CLASSIFICATION APPROVED BY:
POL:WHHallman:gcr	1/30/78	278	DCM:MChaplin

CLEARANCES:
USIS:JHiggins
POLR:JSears
DAO:COLCoughlin
LEGATT:RScherr
SY:RKelly

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CLASSIFICATION

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(Formerly FS-413)
January 1972
Dept. of State

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

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MRV

individual security ~~for~~ service, and of its known involvement in security investigations leads to opposite conclusions. The Navy's anti-terrorist operations in 1976 and early 1977 was very tough in such specific areas as Mar del Plata and Bahia Blanca. The Navy Mechanics School has been cited as a tough interrogation center. Consensus here is that also Massera is responsible for whatever the Navy does. There are few "out of control" theories of rumors about the Navy.

3. Admiral Massera, whatever his other flaws, is an instinctive and savvy politician who has worked hard-- and within some constituencies effectively--to create for himself a base of power grounded upon personal popularity. In addition to his own efforts, Navy officers and civilians especially trusted by Massera go about praising his name and replenishing his laurels. Massera boasts of his contact and popularity with labor people, Peronists, Jews and Civil Rights groups. He has a front man who has even ~~been~~ opened a "civic center" here in Buenos Aires to act in the Admiral's support. While his actions make him look very much like a populist, Massera especially criticizing Army Chief of Staff Viola for his "populist" tendencies. Massera, in fact, bad-mouths his Army colleagues with increasing indiscretion. It was inevitable, we believe, that some bright reporter would

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MEMO

open doors upon Massera's not so-private political activities. Just as Massera has used incidents like the Russian trawlers and, to an extent, the Beagle issue to gain popularity within Argentina, he now appears to be using the human rights issue to gain the good will of the US Government.

4. As of noon January 30 no press coverage of or commentary concerning the "Washington Post" story had appeared, except for brief mention in ^{a Buenos Aires} German language daily to President Carter's reference to the "Washington Post" article. We suspect nothing further will appear, but that the story will nevertheless become widely known here and will cause a stir in government circles.

5. Lastly, we should point out that the rivalry game is not one which Massera plays unopposed. Two publications-- "Creer" and "Tribuna de la Republica"--believed linked closely to Massera have had issues seized and been briefly suspended from publication. This follows the brief banning of "Conviccion", also believed a Navy supported.

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